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Femtechnodystopia
Leah R. Fowler* & Michael R. Ulrich**
Reproductive rights, as we have long understood them, are dead. But
at the same time that history seems to be moving backward, technology
moves relentlessly forward. Femtech products, a category of consumer
technology addressing an array of “female” health needs, seem poised to fill
gaps created by states and stakeholders eager to limit birth control and
abortion access and increase pregnancy surveillance and fetal rights. Period
and fertility tracking applications could supplement or replace other
contraception. Early digital alerts to missed periods can improve the
chances of obtaining a legal abortion in states with ever-shrinking windows
of availability or prompt behavioral changes that support the health of the
fetus. However, more nefarious actors also have interests in these
technologies and the intimate information they contain. In the wrong hands,
these tools can effectuate increased reproductive control and
criminalization. What happens next will depend on whether we can improve
efficacy, limit foreseeable privacy risks, and raise consumer awareness. But
the current legal and regulatory landscape makes achieving these goals far
from a straightforward proposition, further complicated by political
influence and a conservative Supreme Court. Thus, this Article concludes
with multiple solutions involving diverse stakeholders, offering that a
multifaceted approach is needed to keep femtech’s dystopian future from
becoming a reality.
* Research Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center, and Research Director,
Health Law & Policy Institute
** Assistant Professor of Health Law, Ethics, & Human Rights, Boston University School of
Law and Boston University School of Public Health; Solomon Center Distinguished Visiting
Scholar, Yale Law School
We are grateful to Yonathan Arbel, Emily Berman, Jessica Bregant, Seth Chandler, I.
Glenn Cohen, Doron Dorfman, Dave Fagundes, Claire Horner, Alyssa Ladd, Stephanie Morain,
James Nelson, Kristin Kostick-Quenet, David Kwok, Jessica Mantel, Jessica Roberts, Lauren
Schoen, Kayte Spector-Bagdady, Nicolas Terry, and Kellen Zale for their deep engagement with
our work and feedback on earlier drafts; and to Danielle Keats Citron, Abbe Gluck, Nicole
Huberfeld, Linda C. McClain, Chelsea Polis, and Cara Tenenbaum, for their encouragement,
thoughtful conversations, and constructive suggestions. We would also like to thank the organizers
of the University of Houston Law Center Faculty Works-in-Progress Workshop and Amanda
Watson with the University of Houston Law Center library for exceptional research support. All
errors are our own.

1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4099764

DRAFT DO NOT CITE

7/18/22 5:10 PM

FEMTECHNODYSTOPIA

2

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 2
I.FEMTECH IN THE SHADOW OF DOBBS ............................................... 6
A.
The End of Reproductive Rights .................................. 6
1. Access to Birth Control ............................................ 7
2. State Interests in Fetal Life .................................. 14
B.
The Potential Promise of Femtech ............................ 18
1. Quantifying Fertility .............................................. 19
2. Contraception ......................................................... 21
3. Conception and Beyond.......................................... 24
II.FEMTECH’S DYSTOPIA ................................................................... 26
A.
Femtechnodystopia .................................................... 26
1. Inaccurate Apps...................................................... 26
2. Bleeding Data ......................................................... 28
3. Consumer Ignorance .............................................. 30
4. A Period Panopticon ............................................... 31
B.
Regulatory & Legal Shortcomings............................. 35
1. Regulatory Gaps ..................................................... 35
2. Constitutional Obstacles ........................................ 41
III.A DIFFERENT FUTURE FOR FEMTECH ......................................... 46
A.
The Difficulty of Mandating Change ......................... 46
1. Efficacy.................................................................... 46
2. Privacy and Security .............................................. 50
B.
The Hail Mary of Influencing Change ....................... 53
1. Technology Industry Solutions .............................. 53
2. App Developer Approaches .................................... 55
3. Group and Individual Action ................................. 59
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 63
INTRODUCTION
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization1 did exactly
what many now-Supreme Court Justices swore could never happen—it
sent the issue of abortion back to the states.2 But while the law takes
reproductive rights back to the status quo before the landmark Roe v.
Wade decision in 1973,3 consumer technology moves those rights—and

142 S.Ct. 2228 (2022).
Becky Sullivan, What conservative justices said—and didn’t say—about Roe at their
confirmations, NPR (May 3, 2022) https://www.npr.org/2022/05/03/1096108319/roe-v-wade-alitoconservative-justices-confirmation-hearings.
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1
2
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a previously unimaginable surveillance apparatus4—relentlessly into
the future. One such technology is femtech,5 a catch-all term for
products targeting “female”6 health, particularly smartphone-based
applications (apps) for period and fertility tracking.7 However, in light
of Dobbs, the future these technologies will create remains to be seen.
Viewed optimistically, these digital tools could offset some of the
most drastic restrictions on reproductive freedoms. Consumers can use
functionalities that predict fertile days as a form of fertility-awarenessbased contraception, which can soften the impact of limitations or
outright prohibitions on access to other birth control. Apps can also
alert users to pregnancy early—as soon as a period is late. This feature
allows consumers more time to terminate a very early pregnancy in
states where the window to obtain a legal abortion is short.8 And in
places where abortion is unavailable, early notification allows more
time to plan—both financially and logistically—to travel for needed
care. As a result, in a world with ever-shrinking access to abortion and
birth control, period and fertility tracking apps may conveniently and
discreetly increase users’ agency over their reproductive health.9
4 Albert Fox Cahn and Eleni Manis, Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, The
Handmaid’s
Trail:
Abortion
Surveillance
After
Roe
(May
24,
2022)
https://www.stopspying.org/handmaids-trail.
5 The Rise of a New Category: Femtech, CLUE (Sept. 15, 2016). https://helloclue.com/articl
es/culture/rise-new-category-femtech; This term could also include apps that allow consumers to
access hormonal birth control or the “abortion pill” mifepristone and misoprostol). However, those
products are outside the scope of this paper.
6 The “Fem” in “Femtech” is from the word female, though this paper uses inclusive language
wherever possible. The authors recognize that people who menstruate and are capable of becoming
pregnant includes “women, transgender males, intersex persons, [non-]binary persons, and other
persons who have the capacity for a menstrual cycle.” Margaret E. Johnson, Menstrual Justice, 53
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 5 (2019). These groups also use digital menstrual trackers Gene Pinter,
ThemTech: Digital Menstrual Tracking Practices Among Transgender, Non-Binary and Gender
Diverse Users, (November 2020).
7 Some scholars distinguish between fertility trackers and period trackers, asserting that the
former is intended to achieve pregnancy and the latter is not. Sarah E. Fox, Amanda Menkin,
Jordan Eschler, and Uba Backonja, Multiples Over Models: Interrogating the Past and Collectively
Reimagining the Future of Menstrual Sensemaking, ACM Transactions on Computer-Human
Interaction 27(4), Article 22 at Page 9 (2020). However, as we discuss in this Article, we believe
that to be a distinction without a difference for most consumers and intentionally discuss these
technologies as a singular category.
8 For example, Texas’s initial law prevented abortion after six weeks of gestation, which is
only two weeks after a missed period. S.B. 8, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (S.B. 8) (codified at
Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 171.203(b), 171.204(a)). Abortion is completely banned in Texas on
the 30th day after “issuance of a United States Supreme Court judgment in a decision overruling,
wholly or partly, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992), thereby allowing the states of the United States to prohibit abortion.” H.B.
1280, 87th Leg., Reg. Session (Tex. 2021).
9 Molly McHugh, Does Femtech Give Users Control of Their Health or Take it Away? THE
RINGER
(March
18,
2019,
6:30AM
EDT)
available
at
https://www.theringer.com/tech/2019/3/18/18267094/femtech-female-health-apps-menstruationfertility-trackers-clue-glow-ava.
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However, this moment in history warrants healthy pessimism.
People of reproductive potential will not be the only actors interested in
these (and other) technologies and the intimate data they contain.
Faith-based organizations10 or conservative political administrations11
may wish to further their ideological beliefs by engaging directly with
femtech products to promote fertility-awareness-based methods of
contraception over other hormonal and barrier options. Anti-abortionminded individuals or groups may also target advertisements
promoting their agenda based on user data12 or even develop or fund
apps.13 Federal and state actors prohibiting abortions after a certain
length of gestation may be interested in the specific date of a user’s last
menstrual period.14 Citizens could leverage consumer data to avail
themselves of the bounties offered by recent state laws aimed at
curtailing abortion access through private enforcement.15 And in a
future with increased criminalization of fetal-harming behaviors or
even recognition of fetal personhood,16 data about alcohol and other
substance use—and even diet, exercise, and other activities—may be
leveraged in legal actions. In light of this new reality, one of the most
promising tools to counteract the assault on reproductive rights also has
the potential to become one of its greatest weapons.
10 Lilah Burke, Catholic Contraception? Get the App, INSIDE HIGHER ED (January 24, 2020)
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/01/24/catholic-colleges-develop-apps-natural-familyplanning.
11 Kinsey Hasstedt, A Domestic Gag Rule and More: The Trump Administration’s Proposed
Changes
to
Title
X,
Health
Affairs
(June
18,
2018)
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20180614.838675/full/ (describing proposed
rulemaking that imposes a departure from prior definitions of “family planning” to emphasize
“fertility awareness-based methods, and specifically natural family planning”); Brian Beutler,
Leaked Memo Reveals White House Wish List, Crooked (October 19, 2017)
https://crooked.com/articles/leaked-memo-reveals-white-house-wish-list/ (describing a leaked
memo in which the Trump Administration expressed a desire to halve federal funding for Title X
and divert money into programs that promote “fertility awareness” as a method of birth control.).
12 In re Copley Advertising, LLC, No. 1784CV01033 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2017).
13 Eva Wiseman, Beware the Fertility App That Wants to Share Your Data With Anti-Abortion
Campaigners,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
9,
2019)
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/jun/09/app-creep-and-the-dark-side-of-sharingprivate-date-on-our-phones (describing the case of Femm – an app “bankrolled by a hedge-funder
who campaigns against abortion and birth control”); Sarah E. Fox, Amanda Menkin, Jordan
Eschler, and Uba Backonja, Multiples Over Models: Interrogating the Past and Collectively
Reimagining the Future of Menstrual Sensemaking, ACM Transactions on Computer-Human
Interaction 27(4), Article 22 at 7-8 (Describing Femm as “backed by conservative anti-choice
foundation “chiaroscuro” and that it was “said to have shared misleading and inaccurate
information with users regarding the side effects of hormonal birth control.”).
14 See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
15 See e.g., S.B. 8, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (S.B. 8) (codified at Tex. Health & Safety
Code §§ 171.203(b), 171.204(a)).
16 See e.g., S.B. 1457, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 1219A). Currently being challenged in Isaacson v. Brnovich; See also H.B. 704, 134th Gen. Assem.
(Ohio 2021-2022).
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As with all restrictions on freedoms, the worst possible outcomes
are not evenly distributed. The populations most burdened by
limitations on abortion and birth control are the same ones harmed by
systemic racism. Those arrested for behaviors during pregnancy are
more likely people of color, especially in the South.17 And, independent
of race, they are more likely to be poor.18 Alarming pregnancy outcomes,
including horrific maternal mortality rates,19 follow these trends and
mirror concerning data about lower technology literacy.20
All period and fertility tracking apps expose consumers to risks,
but not all apps are regulated the same way. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) distinguishes between contraceptive and
proceptive apps. As a result, most apps do not need to demonstrate
safety or accuracy or include specific labeling before entering the
market. Further, not all apps disclose efficacy and privacy information,
nor does the law generally require them to do so. Worse, the data these
apps contain are not entitled to the same privacy and security
protections as other health-related data and are routinely sold to third
parties, vulnerable to hacking, and shared with law enforcement. But
obvious regulatory and legal solutions are insufficient and unlikely in
the current political landscape. In the context of this reality, the future
of period and fertility tracking apps is, at best, uncertain.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I considers what the
Dobbs decision means for reproductive rights beyond abortion, ranging
from access to contraception to pregnancy surveillance and control, and
the potential for femtech innovation to offset the worst possible
outcomes. But the same qualities that make these technologies so
promising also make them dangerous. Part II identifies how these apps
can worsen the assault on reproductive freedoms—especially in a world
where a constitutional right to privacy may no longer exist, and the
state’s interest in potential life extends from menarche to menopause.
More concerning still, as this Part explores, the regulatory and legal
environment is poorly equipped to avoid the worst possible outcomes
and may even exacerbate the problems these femtech tools can create.
17 Lynn M. Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant
Women in the United States, 1973-2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health,
38 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y AND L. 299, 311 (2013) (“Of the 368 women for whom information on
race was available, 59 percent were women of color, including African Americans, Hispanic
American/Latinas, Native Americans, and Asian/Pacific Islanders; 52 percent were African
American. African American women in particular are overrepresented in our study, but this is
especially true in the South.”).
18 Id. (Noting that “71 percent qualified for indigent defense.”).
19 Khiara M. Bridges, Racial Disparities in Maternal Mortality, 95 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1229 (2020).
20 Saida Mamedova, Emily Pawlowski, A Description of U.S. Adults Who Are Not Digitally
Literate, Stats in Brief (May 2018) https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018161.pdf.
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No serious policy proposal can involve asking everyone capable
of becoming pregnant to opt-out of the digital economy entirely or
simply give up technologies they want to use. Such a position is not only
unrealistic, but it also shifts responsibility onto individuals and could
exacerbate disparities by preventing those most in need from accruing
any potential benefit from technological advancement. Millions of
Americans find these apps beneficial. These consumers deserve highquality products, not simply to be told to stop using and delete these—
or any other—electronic tools. Thus, this Article offers that three key
criteria must be satisfied to realize the promise of period and fertility
tracking apps and avoid the greatest perils. Apps must be effective, the
data they contain must be kept private and secure, and consumers must
be aware of risks and limitations. But solutions to these problems are
complicated by developer conflicts of interest and a reproductive
surveillance state with criminal implications. With this in mind, Part
III offers multiple options that account for practical limitations, a sober
assessment of the current Supreme Court, and political trends. In it, we
turn away from exclusive reliance on government intervention and look
to private industry and individual actions. Our Article concludes with a
warning: We must act now—with all available tools—to prevent
femtech’s dystopian future from becoming a reality.
I. FEMTECH IN THE SHADOW OF DOBBS
Since the Court decided Roe v. Wade, conservative lawmakers,
religious groups, and other anti-choice activists have been hard at work
anticipating and hastening its demise.21 With the Court’s decision in
Dobbs, they have finally achieved their goal of reducing or outright
eliminating access to safe and legal abortions in many parts of the
United States. But this long sought-after accomplishment is not the
end. This Part looks at what comes next in the continued efforts to
curtail reproductive freedoms. It then turns to period and fertility
trackers as a promising potential solution that, if designed well, offers
free, discreet, and convenient tools to increase bodily autonomy at the
same time public and private entities would seek to restrict it.
A. The End of Reproductive Rights
In the Dobbs opinion overturning Roe and Casey, the majority
goes to great lengths to suggest this is a narrow ruling with little impact
21 Jesus Jimenez, What is a Trigger Law? And Which States Have Them? THE NEW YORK
TIMES (May 4, 2022) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/04/us/abortion-trigger-laws.html.
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other than returning the question of abortion to the states.22 But
regardless of whether this is genuine—and we believe it is not—the
opinion itself and the legislative aftermath make clear this is not the
end. States have already sought to restrict abortion as much as possible,
with some removing exceptions for rape and incest and others already
considering fetal personhood statutes. But with abortion’s demise well
underway, the Court’s emphasis on the fetus and the state’s interest in
that fetus “at all stages of development” could give rise to a number of
other challenges to reproductive rights.23 This includes reduced access
to or prohibitions on birth control and increased reproductive
surveillance in the name of protecting fetal health and life.24
1.

Access to Birth Control

A discussion of birth control in constitutional law reveals that
we cannot discount concerns about restrictions or bans on contraception
as unrealistic. Much like access to abortion before Dobbs, contraception
appears to start off as settled law. In the 1965 case Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Supreme Court held there was a constitutional right
to privacy that incorporated within it the right of a married couple to
determine whether to use contraception to prevent pregnancy.25
Though the Constitution does not specifically mention the right to
privacy or the right to contraception, the Court pointed out that the
unenumerated parental right to raise children in a specific manner and
the right to association have long been held as not only constitutional
rights but ones of fundamental importance.26 And, critically, the Court
notes that enumerated rights would be less secure without these
“peripheral rights.”27 Perhaps most important to current conversations
of whether a constitutional right to privacy exists is the declaration in
Griswold that the unenumerated status was less relevant considering
22 Dobbs v. Jackson, 142 S.C.t 2228, 2261 (2022). Justice Thomas’s concurrence raises
considerable doubt about the sincerity of this claim. Id. at 2301 (“in future cases, we should
reconsider all of the Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence,
and Obergefell.”).
23 In its recounting of historical abortion regulations, the Dobbs opinion makes special note of
the application to “all stages” at least thirteen times.
24 A state interest in fetal health would be an expansion of previous state interest, which
focused on the potential life of the fetus, and would open the door to surveillance and intervention
during the pregnancy. See Michael R. Ulrich, With Child, Without Rights? Restoring a Pregnant
Woman’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Through the HIV Lens, 24 YALE J. L. FEMINISM 303,
328 (2012) (finding maternal-fetal jurisprudence does not establish or recognize a state interest in
protecting the health of the fetus to overcome the woman’s liberty interests).
25 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26 Id. at 482.
27 Id. at 483.
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the right to privacy was older than the Bill of Rights itself.28 This line
of thinking was central to the follow-up case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, where
the Court made clear the right to privacy and the right to contraception
it contained emanated not from the couple’s marital status but as a
preexisting Constitutional right for each individual.29
In light of this precedent, the step from revoking the right to
abortion to revoking the right to contraception might seem like a leap.
But reading these cases with new eyes after Dobbs reveals concerning
vulnerabilities in the rights articulated in both Griswold and
Eisenstadt. Dobbs questions the right to privacy generally and
emphasizes the relevance of ongoing public debate, while contraception
remains a contentious public and political issue.30 Dobbs rejected
several arguments for abortion that also apply to the core of a right to
contraception. For example, the Court was unmoved by the claims that
“people will be inhibited from exercising their freedom to choose the
types of relationships they desire” or that “women will be unable to
compete with men in the workplace and in other endeavors.”31 Notably,
the arguments embraced in Dobbs32 about why abortion rights are
nonessential in the modern era can easily apply to contraception:
attitudes about unmarried pregnant women have changed;33 there are
expanded federal and state laws banning discrimination based on

28 Id. at 486. This line of reasoning played a critical role in the Court finding an individual
right to firearms for the purpose of self-defense in District of Columbia v. Heller. 554 U.S. 570
(2008). There, in determining the existence and scope of the right the Court found it important
that the Amendment was merely recognizing a pre-existing right. Id. at 592. Thus, the right to
self-defense, while not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, was “not a right granted by the
Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.” Id.
29 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
30 See Dobbs, 142 S.Ct. at 2245 (discussing the relevance of differing public views and state
legislatures efforts to restrict abortion rights); Senator Marsha Blackburn has explicitly criticized
this case as “constitutionally unsound.” Melissa Brown, Sen. Marsha Blackburn criticizes 1965
Supreme Court ruling on birth control access, Tennessean (March 21, 2022)
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2022/03/21/marsha-blackburn-criticizes-1965supreme-court-ruling-birth-control/7120236001/.
31 Dobbs, 142 S.Ct. at 2258.
32 Id.
33 But see Heidi Moseson, Moria Mahanaimy, Christine Dehlendorf, Caitlin Gerdts, “…Society
is, at the end of the day, still going to stigmatize you no matter which way”: A qualitative study of
the impact of stigma on social support during unintended pregnancy in early adulthood, 14 PLOS
ONE 1 (2019).
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pregnancy;34 there is increased leave for pregnancy and childbirth;35
costs of health care for pregnancy are often covered by insurance or
government assistance;36 and safe haven laws allow people to drop off
newborns without fear of criminalization.37
These are reasons enough to be suspicious about access to
contraception in the post-Dobbs legal landscape, but the opinion
highlights more cause for concern. Dobbs dismisses privacy and equal
protection as justifications for the right to access abortion, leaving the
Court to focus on the abortion right itself.38 But unenumerated rights,
according to the Court, must be “deeply rooted in [our] history and
tradition” as an essential element to our Nation’s “scheme of ordered
liberty.”39 Under the current Court’s perspective, contraception likely
has no greater historical root than abortion.40 And Dobbs emphasizes

34 But see, Carly McCann and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Pregnancy Discrimination at Work:
An Analysis of Pregnancy Discrimination Charges Filed with the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Center for Employment Equity (May 26, 2021) (finding that “despite an
overall higher success rate of receiving benefits than other forms of sex discrimination, the
majority (74%) of pregnancy charges result in no monetary benefit or required workplace change
through EEOC process.”).
35 But see, Van Niel, Maureen Sayres, Richa Bhatia, and Nicholas S. Riano et. al. The Impact
of Paid Maternity Leave on the Mental and Physical Health of Mothers and Children: A Review of
the literature and Policy Implications, 28 HARVARD REV. OF PSYCHIATRY 112, 113 (2020) (noting
that only 16% of all employed American workers have access to paid parental leave through their
workplace” and that “as many as 23% of employed mothers return to work within ten days of giving
birth, because of their inability to pay living expenses without income.”).
36 But see Michelle H. Moniz, A. Mark Fendrick, Giselle E. Kolenic, Anca Tilea, et. al., OutOf-Pocket Spending for Maternity Care Among Women With Employer-Based Insurance, (2008-15),
39 HEALTH AFF. 1 (January 2020) (finding that that between 2008 and 2015, average out-of-pocket
spending for maternity care rose among women with employer-based insurance).
37 While theoretically available in all 50 states, and sometimes in some circumstances free
from the threat of criminalization, infant safe havens are rarely used. According to the National
Safe Haven Alliance’s annual impact report, 115 babies were dropped off in 2021. This represents
.00003143% of live births in that same year. National Safe Haven Alliance 2021 Impact Report;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Vital Statistics Rapid Release, Births: Provisional
Data for 2021(May 2022).
38 The Court also rejected claims connecting abortion to rights of autonomy and defining one’s
concept of existence, which the Court could do the same for attempts to link a right to contraception
to broader conceptual rights such as autonomy, equity, or justice. Dobbs, 142 S.Ct. at 2245. Despite
a compelling brief arguing the Mississippi law violated the equal protection clause, the Court
dispensed with equal protection in one paragraph stating that precedent foreclosed abortion
restrictions as a sex-based restriction. Id. at 2245-46. Contra Brief for Equal Protection
Constitutional Law Scholars Serena Mayeri, Melissa Murray, and Reva Siegel as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S.Ct. 2228 (2022).
39 Dobbs, 142 S.Ct. at 2246 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg). Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, a 1997 case considering the right to physician aid in dying, is often quoted as the
guiding principle for unenumerated rights.
40 But see Brief for American Historical Association and Organization of American Historians
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142
S.Ct. 2228 (2022).
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that, while penalties for abortion may have differed at common law, no
authority endorsed a “positive right to procure an abortion.”41
The Court would not have difficulty finding evidence to support
an argument that contraception was not historically viewed as a
positive right. For example, the Court could point to Dr. Charles
Knowlton’s conviction in 1832—thirty-six years before the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment—for publishing the Fruits of Philosophy,
in which he advocated for the use and benefits of birth control.42 That
he was convicted and sentenced to “three months at hard labor” and his
conviction “aroused very little public attention” could be used as
evidence that contraception was not viewed as a right.43 The Court
could suggest that if prosecution for even writing about birth control
was not out of line with legal thinking and public sentiment at the time,
it is highly unlikely a positive right to contraception existed.44
Further, the Court might consider the Comstock Act, which
Congress passed in 1873, five years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification.45 The Comstock Act criminalized mailing “obscene, lewd or
lascivious,” “immoral,” or “indecent” publications, making it a federal
offense to disseminate contraception through the mail and across state
lines, punishable by up to five years in prison.46 Soon after, twenty-four
of thirty-seven states passed similar laws to restrict contraception
access.47 It was not until the twentieth century that challenges to
contraception restrictions were successful, though narrowly construed.
In light of these facts, the Court is unlikely to view access to
contraception as a right deeply rooted in our history and tradition.
Of course, any discussion of Dobbs would be incomplete without
addressing what the Court identified as the key distinguishing factor
singling out abortion from other substantive due process rights such as
intimate sexual relations, marriage, and contraception. The Court
emphasized that abortion is fundamentally different because it destroys
what the law at issue described as an “unborn human being.”48 But we
are intensely skeptical about whether this truly distinguishes abortion
Dobbs, 142 S.Ct. at 2251 (emphasis in original).
Norman E. Himes, Charles Knowlton’s Revolutionary Influence on the English Birth Rate,
199 NEW ENG. J. MED. 461, 463 (1928).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles
of Immoral Use (Comstock Act), March 3, 1873, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 599.
46 Id.
47 Even a lack of laws criminalizing contraception would not qualify as sufficient evidence
under Dobbs because “the fact that many States in the late 18th and early 19th century did not
criminalize pre-quickening abortions does not mean that anyone thought the States lacked the
authority to do so.” Dobbs, 142 S.Ct. at 2255.
48 Id. at 2243.
41
42

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4099764

DRAFT DO NOT CITE

7/18/22 5:10 PM

FEMTECHNODYSTOPIA

11

from contraception, and with good reason. The majority opinion in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby—also written by Justice Alito, author of the
Dobbs majority—casts doubt about the sincerity of the claim that
abortion and contraception are different. In Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito
accepted that many contraception methods were abortifacients for the
mere fact that the petitioners believed them to be equivalent to
abortion.49 These alleged “abortion-inducing drugs”—as Justice
Kavanaugh later called them during his 2018 confirmation hearing50—
included emergency contraception, often called the “morning after pill,”
and intrauterine devices (IUDs).51
For many, the dividing line between abortion and birth control
is not as clear as one might initially assume and rests on a subjective
belief about what is medically, legally, and ethically significant. A
prevailing definition of pregnancy used by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists is when a sperm penetrates an egg and
that fertilized egg implants itself in the uterine wall.52 By this
definition, the mechanism must destroy the implanted embryo or fetus
to abort a pregnancy.53 Neither emergency contraceptives nor IUDs
affect an already-implanted embryo. Emergency contraceptives inhibit
ovulation, while IUDs primarily operate by changing cervical mucus to
make it inhospitable to sperm.54 These facts should theoretically
prevent the contraceptive methods at issue in Hobby Lobby from
reasonably qualifying as abortifacients.

49 573 U.S. 682, 691 (2014) (“according to their religious beliefs the four contraceptive methods
at issue are abortifacients.”); See also I. Glenn Cohen, Melissa Murray, and Lawrence O. Gostin,
The End of Roe v. Wade and New Legal Frontiers on the Constitutional Right to Abortion, J. AM.
MED. ASSOC. Published online July 08, 2022. doi:10.1001/jama.2022.12397.
50 Jenavieve Hatch, Brett Kavanaugh Refers to Birth Control As Abortion Inducing Dugs at
Confirmation Hearing, HUFFPOST (September 6, 2018) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/brettkavanaugh-birth-control_n_5b917b79e4b0162f472b3cb8.
51 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 701.
52 Grace S. Chung, Ryan E. Lawrence, Kenneth A. Rasinski, John D. Yoo, and Farr A. Curlin,
Obstetrician-gynecologists’ beliefs about when pregnancy begins, 206 RESEARCH OBSTETRICS
132.e1, 132.e1 (2012) (“Since 1965, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG) has defined pregnancy as beginning with implantation of the embryo in the uterine
wall. This definition is used also by the Guttmacher Institute, Planned Parenthood, and some
textbooks.”).
53 The term “embryo” is used for the first 8 weeks after implantation. 9 weeks after
implantation, it is called a fetus. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, How Your
Fetus Grows During Pregnancy https://www.acog.org/womens-health/faqs/how-your-fetus-growsduring-pregnancy.
54 Jen Gunter, The Medical Facts About Birth Control and Hobby Lobby—From an OB/GYN,
THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 6, 2014) https://newrepublic.com/article/118547/facts-about-birthcontrol-and-hobby-lobby-ob-gyn.
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For some, including the corporate leadership of Hobby Lobby,
the relevant focal point is not implantation but fertilization,55 even
though fertilization is not a point that science can establish in vivo by
any existing medical test. For those espousing this perspective, any
contraception preventing a fertilized egg from implanting would
constitute an abortion. And while the types of contraception at issue in
Hobby Lobby did not affect a fertilized egg or implanted embryo,56 it was
the mere theoretical possibility that they could prevent a fertilized egg
from implanting in the uterus in some small and unspecified number of
cases, and the asserted personal beliefs that life begins at conception,
that proved sufficient for the Court.57 Hobby Lobby demonstrates that
the Court can disregard scientific evidence about how a contraceptive
operates based on an individual or group’s subjective belief about the
contraception or when pregnancy begins. Indeed, the Court makes clear
that the judiciary has no authority to address whether religious beliefs
are reasonable.58 Given what it described as high moral stakes, the
Court opposed a “binding national answer” to whether these
contraceptives equated to abortion.59 While the Court could require
more from a state legislature than the mere belief they accepted from
the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs, Dobbs emphasizes deference to states and
elected officials who can best represent their constituency's moral views
on abortion. Thus, if a state legislature enshrines the belief that life
begins at fertilization into law—as many already have in Dobbs’s
wake—the Court’s opinion in Dobbs, along with its broader protection
of religious beliefs, suggests a deference to leave this as a “state issue.”
This raises the critical question of whether the Court would even
need to overturn Griswold to enable valid restrictions or bans on certain
types of contraception. We do not think it would. If some popular
contraceptive methods—like those in Hobby Lobby—can be legally
55 Claire Horner & Lisa Campo-Engelstein, Dueling Definitions of Abortifacient: How
Cultural, Political, and Religious Values Affect Language in the Contraception Debate, 50
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 14 (2020). See also United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,
Another Look at Contraception, https://www.usccb.org/committees/pro-life-activities/another-lookcontraception (“it's scientifically indisputable that a new human life begins when an embryo first
forms at fertilization—6 to 8 days before implantation.”). A slight majority of obstetriciangynecologists also believe that pregnancy begins at fertilization. Chung et al., supra note 52, at
132.e3 (finding that 57% of US obstetrician-gynecologists believe pregnancy begins at conception).
56 See Horner & Campo-Engelstein, supra note 55.
57 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 723-24.
58 Id. 724.
59 Id. The Court echoed this language in Dobbs, chastising Roe and Casey for “usurp[ing] the
power to address a question of profound moral and social important.” Dobbs, 142 S.Ct. at 2265.
The framing of abortion as a moral issue and one best left to state representatives could lead to
the Court accepting more arguments akin to those made in Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the Court
accepted and found persuasive that “some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant
life they once created and sustained,” despite having “no reliable data.” 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
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categorized as abortifacients, they may fall under the abortion
restrictions in place after Dobbs. And if state legislative trends are
successful, even more forms of birth control may qualify as abortions.
Louisiana HB813, for example, would have altered the definition of
“person” by stating that life begins at the moment of fertilization,
independent of implantation.60 In doing so, the bill aimed to protect a
fertilized egg “by the same laws protecting other human beings.”61
The long and ultimately successful battle to overturn Roe
illustrates the increasingly powerful political voice of those in the antiabortion movement, even though they represent a minority viewpoint.62
This group overlaps with opponents of contraception, which, in our
view, makes increased restrictions on birth control all but certain. To
support this assertion, consider what happened following Hobby Lobby.
After the decision, more organizations could avoid providing
contraception coverage by simply filling out a form stating their
religious objections. The insurance company would then provide
payments to beneficiaries for contraceptive services they could acquire
independently.63 But, religious groups challenged this regulation in
Zubik v. Burwell and Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, arguing
that filling out a form was still complicit in providing what they believed
equated to abortion.64 Opposition to contraception was at the heart of
the matter due to the religious groups’ conviction that “deliberately
avoiding reproduction through medical means is immoral.”65
If Hobby Lobby walked so Zubik and Little Sisters of the Poor
could run, Dobbs is sprinting to usher in an even more aggressive era
of minority morality-based restrictions. And these actors now have a
new blueprint with Texas’s SB8, which further calls into question any
need to overturn Griswold to achieve widespread restrictions or bans
on certain types of contraception. This law allows private citizens to sue
anyone who aids or abets a pregnant individual in obtaining an abortion
after six weeks and awards a bounty of $10,000 or more.66 This vigilante
approach has opened the door to what is, at least theoretically,
constitutionally possible for restricting reproductive rights.67 And the
Supreme Court’s willingness to allow SB8 to go into effect while clearly
H.B. 813, Reg. Session (Louisiana 2022).
Id.
62
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Public Opinion on Abortion, (May
https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion/.
63 Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 140 S.Ct. 2367, 2375 (2020).
64 Id. at 2376.
65 Id.
66 See supra note 8.
67 Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson No 22-0033 (Tex. 2022).
60
61
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violating both Roe and Casey, which were still in effect at the time, could
be seen as an open invitation to these types of restrictions and beyond.68
For instance, Missouri is trying to stop people from crossing state lines
to obtain an abortion through the same method used by Texas, a
position that would have previously seemed unimaginable.69
Contraception bans, then, may just be the tip of the iceberg.
2.

State Interests in Fetal Life

The connection between a post-Dobbs world and the potential
restrictions on contraception stems from the Court’s narrow focus on
the state’s interest in the fetus. The Dobbs opinion does not consider the
potential impact of overruling Roe and Casey on the health outcomes of
pregnant people, including maternal mortality.70 Nor does it
contemplate how a state may use this increased interest to limit the
freedoms and liberties of both those who are pregnant but also anyone
who could become pregnant. In light of these omissions, we are left with
expanded justification for surveillance and few limits on what the state
can do to protect the fetus at “all stages of development.”71
We have seen this interest taken to extremes even under Roe. In
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Hospital Authority, the Supreme Court of
Georgia held that a viable fetus had Constitutional rights, allowing the
state to override the mother’s refusal of a cesarean section.72 In
Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, a Florida
District Court authorized law enforcement to take a woman from her
home and return her to the hospital for a cesarean section against her
will.73 In this case, the court used the fact that the woman wanted to
give birth against her, outweighing her right to refuse a specific method
of birth.74 In the same vein, after Dobbs, courts may weigh the future
birth against an individual’s right to control any actions that could
impact the fetus. Indeed, if the state can force someone to gestate

Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
Caroline Kitchener, Missouri lawmakers seeks to stop residents from obtaining abortions
out
of
state,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(March
8,
2022)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/08/missouri-abortion-ban-texas-supremecourt/.
70 In fact, the Court considers the connection between abortion rights and health unclear:
“That form of reliance depends on an empirical question that is hard for anyone—and in particular,
for a court—to assess, namely, the effect of the abortion right on society and in particular on the
lives of women. Dobbs, 142 S.Ct. at 2277.
71 Id. at 2284.
72 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981).
73 66 F.Supp.2d 1247, 1250 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
74 Id. at 1251.
68
69
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against their will, courts may see everything else as a lesser intrusion
on their rights.75
The claim in these circumstances was a threat to the fetus’s
wellbeing. A forced cesarean section is an extreme invasion of personal
autonomy. But the constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment—confirmed as a fundamental right by the Court in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health76—was irrelevant if the
state considered vaginal birth risky to the fetus. Yet, it is worth noting
that a medical certainty of risk has not been required in these cases. In
re Baby Boy Doe, for example, is another case where the state sought a
forced cesarean section because, in its judgment, the fetus stood almost
no chance of surviving a natural birth.77 Notwithstanding numerous
efforts from the state, the courts declined to override the competent
woman’s right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Despite the nearcertain risk of death that the state alleged, the woman vaginally
delivered a healthy baby.78 But the court’s decision to allow the woman
to determine how to birth stemmed from the woman’s right to choose—
a choice that Dobbs has compromised if not outright eliminated.
These cases clarify that even under Roe there was an interest
not simply in restricting or minimizing abortion but in controlling
pregnancy decisions in the name of the fetus. Post-Dobbs, the state’s
interest in the fetus—and a court’s willingness to accept that interest
as a justification for restricting or ignoring the rights, preferences, and
autonomous choices of pregnant persons—will only increase. After all,
if the state can tell you that you must carry a fetus to term and give
birth, and even how you must give birth, it is difficult to see why this
could not extend into increased reproductive surveillance to protect and
promote fetal health throughout pregnancy. Even under Roe, police
interrogation following pregnancy loss has included questions like, “Did
you do everything in your power to ensure that you’d have a healthy
baby?”79 Dobbs raises the potential to prosecute behaviors during
pregnancy in the name of the fetus’s expanding rights.
We need not speculate about what type of surveillance this
might entail or who it will target because history provides those
75 See, e.g., id. at 1252 (“in Roe the Court said a third-trimester mother can be forced against
her will to bear a child she does not want; this is in fact a substantially greater imposition on the
mother’s constitutional interests than requiring a mother to give birth by one method rather than
another.”).
76 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
77 632 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
78 Id. at 329.
79 Voluntary Statement of Angela Kennedy (Dec. 11, 1998), State v. Kennedy, No. 03-GS-42–
1708 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Spartanburg County Jan. 5, 2004) (Hayes, J.) (statement resulting from
an interrogation in a hospital room).
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answers. Even under Roe, efforts to police pregnancy were constant.
Legislation and enforcement often focused on drug use and were
disproportionately imposed against people of color. Ferguson v. City of
Charleston provides a useful illustration.80 This case concerned a
hospital policy where staff, in collaboration with law enforcement,
would test the urine of pregnant patients “suspected of drug abuse”
without a warrant or the woman’s knowledge or consent.81 Of the thirty
women who were tested and “failed” under the policy, twenty-nine were
Black,82 and the medical record of the one white pregnant woman
contained the note that she lived “with her boyfriend who is a Negro.”83
While the policy was formally described as an effort to get these women
into substance abuse programs, most were never offered drug treatment
before being sent to jail.84 Thus, a policy that on paper looked like an
effort to increase access to substance abuse treatment, in reality,
resulted in Black women in shackles and chains.85
The persistent and racialized efforts to criminalize crack cocaine
included prosecution of pregnant women, despite evidence that the
risks to the fetus are surprisingly minimal.86 This is not to suggest that
crack cocaine use during pregnancy is safe, but rather that overstated
risks of severe harm helped justify prosecutorial efforts against Black
women.87 This is especially true when compared with other risky but
far less criminalized behaviors, such as the use of drugs more likely to
be abused by wealthier white people. Even medical journals contributed
to the problem, publishing four times as many articles on prenatal

80 532 U.S. 67, 68-69 (2001). Ferguson was raised in the Dobbs oral argument by Justice
Thomas. Though not at issue or directly linked to the questions in Dobbs, Justice Thomas’s
invocation of the Ferguson facts could indicate a willingness to police pregnancies for the health
and wellbeing of the fetus. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, 142 S.Ct. 2228 (2002) (No. 19-1392).
81 532 U.S. 67, 68-71 (2001).
82 We capitalize the “b” in “Black” for the same reasons that Kimberlé Crenshaw articulates
in her work. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“When
using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and
other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper
noun.” (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda
for Theory, 7 Signs 515, 516 (1982))); see also Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241,
1244 n.6 (1991) (“By the same token, I do not capitalize ‘white,’ which is not a proper noun, since
whites do not constitute a specific cultural group.”).
83 Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62
ALBANY L. REV. 999, 1025 (1999).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Dorothy E. Roberts, KILLING THE BLACK BODY 159 (Vintage Books 2d ed 2017) (1997).
87 Id.
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cocaine exposure compared to publications on the effects of the heroin
epidemic in the previous decade.88
The history of surveilling pregnancy under Roe suggests even
more draconian policies in the future as the state’s interest in the fetus
at earlier stages of pregnancy grows. And, as history shows, those
policies need only be tenuously linked to scientific evidence, if at all.
According to Dobbs, the state has a legitimate interest to act in the
interest of prenatal life “at all stages of development.”89 Thus, while
arguments remain about when pregnancy begins or whether and when
a fetus can feel pain, the Supreme Court has made clear that the issue
of protecting the fetus is not a scientific or medical issue, but a moral
one.90 And with the Court now proclaiming the rational basis test
applies to any reproduction-related restriction, a legitimate interest is
all the state needs to justify its actions.91 Given this low legal threshold,
the Court’s endorsement of state action to protect prenatal life at all
stages, and the decreasing focus on the adverse impact of such actions
on women’s rights and liberty interests, the government’s power to
monitor and control behaviors or actions that could be considered risky
to fetal health appears unlimited.
If the question truly becomes, “Did you do everything in your
power to ensure that you’d have a healthy baby?” then abortion is
hardly the stopping point. Eating habits may become increasingly
monitored; out of fear over risks to the fetus, particular foods could be
seen as potentially dangerous, as could gaining too much or too little
weight. Drinking habits may be more heavily scrutinized. Untethered
from a need for scientific or medical consensus, the state may disregard
any science about whether a half glass of wine poses no risk. There
could be a state interest not only in whether someone is exercising but
what type of exercise they are doing. Further, if you cannot medically
establish the existence of a fertilized egg before it implants, in states
that define life as beginning at fertilization, that interest could extend
for the entire duration of a person’s reproductive life. And while
positioning any fertile person with a uterus in a perpetual state of prepregnancy may seem farfetched, it would not be the first time a
government entity adopted this position to promote fetal health.92
Id.
Dobbs, 142 S.Ct. at 2284.
90 Id. at 2258 (“do not claim that any new scientific learning calls for a different answer to
the underlying moral question.”).
91 Id. at 2284.
92 See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Recommendations to Improve
Preconception Health and Health Care—United States: A Report of the CDC/ATSDR Preconception
Care Work Group and the Select Panel on Preconception Care ((April 21, 2006) 55(RR06)
88
89
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As with increased surveillance and criminalization of pregnancy
under Roe, this type of monitoring puts people of color at the greatest
risk. Ferguson demonstrates that these programs typically require an
initial assessment of who participates in risky behavior. Black women
have disproportionately higher maternal mortality rates and worse
birth outcomes.93 While this is likely due to a number of factors,
including racism, this alone could be used to justify an inappropriate
focus on this demographic for heightened surveillance and monitoring
under the guise of protecting the fetus and newborn. And the shift from
Roe’s strict scrutiny to Dobbs’s rational basis standard of review will
likely provide a shield to any claims of racial profiling.
B. The Potential Promise of Femtech
Unfortunately, the future of reproductive freedoms is unfolding
in such a way that the worst possible projections also seem the most
likely. After Dobbs, this trajectory may extend to restrictions on birth
control and increased surveillance of anyone pregnant or capable of
becoming pregnant. But innovation in the femtech market could help
offset some of the worst possible outcomes by putting apps with the
potential to enhance bodily autonomy in the pockets of anyone with a
smartphone.
The term “femtech” encompasses a broad range of lucrative
products94 targeting users across the life course.95 In this category,
period and fertility trackers96 could be among the most promising—and
least ethically contentious—choice-preserving tools. Some of these apps
could function as birth control. Others could change the narrative on
(suggesting we treat all women as “pre-pregnant” to promote fetal health). More recently the World
Health Organization suggested measures to prevent women of childbearing age from consuming
alcohol, World Health Organization, Global Health Action Plan 2022-2030 (June 2021).
93 Juanita J. Chinn, Iman K. Martin, and Nicole Redmond, Health Equity Among Black
Women in the United States, 30 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 212 (2021).
94 PR Newswire, Women’s Health App Market Worth $8.9 Billion by 2028 | CAGR: 19.0%:
Grand View Research, Inc. (June 14, 2021) https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/womens-health-app-market-size-worth-8-9-billion-by-2028--cagr-19-0-grand-viewresearch-inc-301311421.html; Menstrual health apps represent the largest segment of the
women’s health app market share, Precedence Research Women’s Health App Market (By
Type: Fitness & Nutrition, Menstrual Health, Disease Management, Pregnancy Tracking,
Menopause, and Others) – Global Industry Analysis, Size, Share, Growth, Trends, Regional
Outlook, and Forecast 2021 – 2030, https://www.precedenceresearch.com/womens-healthapp-market.
95 Megan B. Fitzpatrick and Avnesh S. Thakor, Advances in Precision Health and Emerging
Diagnostics for Women, 8 J. CLIN. MED. 1525 (2019).
96 Period trackers are occasionally called “menstruapps” Laura Shipp and Jorge Blasco, How
Private is Your Period?: A Systematic Analysis of Menstrual App Privacy Policies, 4 PROCEEDINGS
ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 491 (2020).
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surveillance, shifting it from the prying intrusion to one of empowering
self-monitoring. Given their enormous potential reach, period and
fertility trackers could theoretically be the discreet and individualized
antidote to a world with an increasing sense that pregnant bodies are
public property. And this is true regardless of whether a user intends
to terminate a pregnancy or carry it to term.
1.

Quantifying Fertility

To understand the promise of period and fertility trackers, one
must first understand what they are and how they work. These apps
include an array of similar products that differ primarily in the data
and method used to generate predictions and the product’s intended
use. Predictions can include dates of menstrual periods, the onset of the
symptoms of premenstrual syndrome, ovulation, and fertile windows.
Apps generate these predictions through user inputs, which vary
depending on the product. Some apps only collect dates.97 Some are
associated with wearables98 or other devices like proprietary
thermometers.99 Some apps analyze a combination of biological inputs.
For others, the algorithm obscures which data points are relevant or
how the algorithm uses them.100
Apps can theoretically take data and generate reliable
predictions because the menstrual cycle is, at least in the abstract,
regular and cyclic.101 In addition to hormone fluctuations, the human
body signals fertility through observable physiological changes. These
patterns reveal ovulation. For example, one method of predicting
ovulation is counting the days between the onset of menstrual

97 Marguerite Duane et al., The Performance of Fertility Awareness-Based Method Apps
Marketed to Avoid Pregnancy, 29 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 508, 508 (2016) (describing an app
that uses the “standard days method.”). The “standard days method” involves counting days in the
cycle.
Facts
About
Fertility,
Standard
Days
Method,
available
at
https://www.factsaboutfertility.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/StandardDaysPEH.pdf.
98 Ava Fertility Monitor Bracelet, https://www.avawomen.com/.
99 Daysy Fertility Monitor Thermometer, usa.daysy.me.
100 See supra note 97; Laetitia Della Bianca, The Cyclic Self: Menstrual Cycle Tracking as
Body Politics, CATALYST: FEMINISM, THEORY, AND TECHNOSCIENCE 7(1):1-21 at 10–11 (2021)
(describing the software as a “black box.”).
101 This is an average length that assumes a regular menstrual cycle, which typically ranges
from 21-35 days. However, approximately 14-25% of women have irregular menstrual cycles.
National
Institutes
of
Health,
What
are
Menstrual
Irregularities?
https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/menstruation/conditioninfo/irregularities; Irregular
cycles have been associated with factors such as body mass index, stress, and smoking. Jinju Bae,
Susan Park, and Jin-Won Kwon, Factors Associated with Menstrual Cycle Irregularity and
Menopause, BCM WOMEN’S HEALTH 36 (2018).
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bleeding.102 On average, a menstrual cycle is 28 days long, meaning
there are 28 days between the first day of one period and the first day
of the next.103 Ovulation is estimated to happen in the middle—in this
example, around day 14.104 Another signal is basal body temperature,
which is the temperature of the body when fully at rest.105 Basal body
temperature will peak around ovulation.106 Lastly, changes in cervical
mucus from thick and pasty to a clear, slippery, lubricative consistency
can also provide a marker of ovulation.107 Pregnancy can only occur
within a relatively short window of the menstrual cycle—not accounting
for sperm survival in the reproductive tract, at the point of ovulation
and approximately 24 hours following108—so observing these patterns
over time can prove useful for avoiding or achieving pregnancy.
With hundreds of period and fertility tracking apps available in
the Apple App and Google Play stores—most of which are free—
technology has made menstrual tracking more convenient and
discreet.109 And this category of apps is far from niche: some of the
largest technology companies offer menstruation tracking features,
including Apple, which introduced a period tracking app in 2015,110 and
Google, which added a cycle tracker to its Google Fit product in 2021.111

102 Jonathan R. Bull, Simon P. Rowland, Elina Berglund Scherwitzl, Raoul Scherwitzl, et al,
Real-World Menstrual Cycle Characteristics of More than 600,000 Menstrual Cycles, 2 NPJ
DIGITAL MED. 83 (2019) (finding that the widely held belief that ovulation occurs consistently on
day 14 of the cycle is often not correct).
103 Dhanalakshmi K. Thiyagarajan, Hajira Basit, and Rebecca Jeanmonod. "Physiology,
menstrual
cycle." StatPearls
[Internet].
StatPearls
Publishing,
2020.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK500020/.
104 Id.
105 J.P. Royston, Basal Body Temperature, Ovulation, and the Risk of Conception, with Special
Reference to the Lifetimes of Sperm and Egg, 38 BIOMETRICS 397 (1982).
106 Id.
107 Richard J. Fehring, Accuracy of the Peak Day of Cervical Mucus as a Biological Marker of
Fertility, 66 CONTRACEPTION 231 (2002).
108 Sperm can survive in the body for up to five days. Some sources account for this fact and
estimate that a person can get pregnant approximately 6 days each cycle. Jennifer Rainey
Marquez, How to Chart Your Menstrual Cycle, Grow by WebMD (February 20, 2020)
https://www.webmd.com/baby/charting-your-fertility-cycle.
109 A 2016 study searching for menstrual cycle tracking apps yielded 1,116 apps Michelle L.
Moglia et al., Evaluation of Smartphone Menstrual Cycle Tracking Applications Using an Adapted
APPLICATIONS Scoring System, 127 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1153, 1153-55 (2016). 3.3% of
apps in the Google Play Store require payment as compared with 6.1% of iOS apps. STATISTICA,
Distribution of free and paid Android apps in the Google Play Store as of March 2022
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266211/distribution-of-free-and-paid-android-apps/;
STATISTICA, Distribution of free and paid iOS apps in the Apple App Store as of March 2022
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1020996/distribution-of-free-and-paid-ios-apps/.
110 Donna Lu, The Femtech Gold Rush, 242 NEW SCIENTIST 3232, 20-21 (2019).
111 Rita El Khoury, Google Fit’s Health Data is Now More Beautiful and More Functional (APK
Download) ANDROID POLICE (July 29,2021) https://www.androidpolice.com/2021/07/29/google-fitshealth-data-is-now-more-beautiful-and-more-functional-apk-download/.
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It is no surprise that period and fertility trackers have become
mainstream alongside a booming market for consumer-facing digital
health products. This type of tracking is part of the broader quantifiedself movement, in which various digital monitors and trackers offer
high-tech yet “natural” ways to understand, optimize, and control the
human body.112 This meshes seamlessly with the dominant approach to
health care in the United States, which has traditionally emphasized
personal over collective responsibility and viewed attempts to intervene
as paternalistic infringements on individual liberty.
The quantified-self movement positions reproductive bodies
within a context of medicalization and risk113 and operates under the
assumption that we can control our bodies through technological selfsurveillance.114 As a result, for many app users, there is a sense that
tracking menstrual cycles is not just an optional activity but a
requirement of being a good “digitized reproductive citizen.”115 Within
this paradigm, there is a belief that intense monitoring is not only good
but essential to the health of a pregnant person and, ultimately,
through other pregnancy and childcare apps, the health of the fetus and
born child.116 By this logic, failing to self-track is merely a result of
laziness, incompetence, indifference, or even ignorance.117 Possibly even
negligence.
2.

Contraception

The importance of observing and recording menstrual cycles to
prevent pregnancy has long been understood. Improved scientific
112 Deborah Lupton, Quantified Sex: A Critical Analysis of Sexual and Reproductive SelfTracking Using Apps, 17 CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY 440 (2015). See also Deborah Lupton,
The Digitally Engaged Patient: Self-Monitoring and Self-Care in the Digital Health Era, 11 SOCIAL
THEORY & HEALTH 256 (2013); Deborah Lupton, Quantifying the Body: Monitoring and Measuring
Health in the Age of mHealth Technologies, 23 CRITICAL PUB HEALTH 393 (2013).
113 See Lupton, Quantified Sex, supra note 112; Deborah Lupton, M-Health and Health
Promotion: The Digital Cyborg and Surveillance Society, 10 SOCIAL THEORY & HEALTH 229, 239
(2012).
114 Adrienne Evans, Sarah Riley, and Martine Robson, Postfeminist healthism: Pregnant with
Anxiety in the Time of Contradiction, JURA GENTIUM CENTRE VOL. XVII(1): 95-118.
115 Deborah Lupton, D, 'Mastering your fertility': the digitised reproductive citizen. In A.
McCosker, S. Vivienne, & A. Johns (Eds.), Negotiating Digital Citizenship: Control, Contest and
Culture (pp. 81-93). London: Rowman & Littlefield. (2016); Deborah Lupton, Apps as Artefacts:
Toward a Critical Perspective on Health and Medical Apps, 4 SOCIETIES 606, 612 (2014); Deborah
Lupton, ‘Precious Cargo’: Foetal Subjects, Risk, and Reproductive Citizenship, 22 CRITICAL PUBLIC
HEALTH 2 (2012).
116 Deborah Lupton, Caring Dataveillance: Women’s Use of Apps to Monitor Pregnancy and
Children, THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO DIGITAL MEDIA AND CHILDREN. Routledge, 393-402
(2020).
117 See Lupton, The Digitally Engaged Patient, supra note 112.
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knowledge about ovulation in the 1920s led to the “rhythm method,”118
which evolved with the more nuanced understanding of signals like
temperature and cervical mucus into approaches like the Billings
Ovulation Method in the 1960s119 and the Creighton Model in the
1980s.120 There are now several accepted fertility-awareness-based
methods for pregnancy prevention, including calendar, mucus-only,
basal body temperature, symptothermal, and urinary-hormone-based
methods.121 These approaches can be effective, and some boast a less
than 1% failure rate with perfect use,122 which is as good as many forms
of hormonal contraception and better than many barrier methods.123
Importantly, these methods are subject to none of the same
criticisms that appear in debates about contraceptive mandates,
religious and moral objections, or abortifacient potential identified in
Subpart IA1.124 They mesh with new-age holistic wellness movements
vilifying pharmaceuticals and promoting “natural” approaches.125 Even
the Catholic Church, well known to take one of the more extreme
positions on birth control, has considered fertility-awareness-based
family planning ethically permissible within marriage since 1968.126
The Church even teaches natural family planning in preparation for the
sacrament of marriage.127 And this support translates to app
development. For example, Georgetown University—a Catholic
institution that will not dispense hormonal contraception at the on-

118 The “rhythm method” is not an evidence-based form of fertility-awareness based method
of natural family planning. See supra note 98.
119 Carol A. Quarini, History of Contraception, 2 WOMEN’S HEALTH MEDICINE 28, (2005).
120 The Creighton Model, Fertility Appreciation Collaborative to Teach the Science
https://www.factsaboutfertility.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CreightonPEH.pdf.
121 Rachel Peragallo Urrutia & Chelsea B. Polis, Fertility awareness based methods for
pregnancy prevention, BMJ 366 (2019).
122 Contraceptive use failure rates are often described for both perfect use and typical use.
Perfect use means that the user follows the instruction perfectly—like in a clinical trial or other
highly controlled environment. Typical use accounts for errors people make in real life.
123 See Urrutia & Polis, supra note 121.
124 See supra Part IA.
125
Lindsay
Gellman,
Who’s
Afraid
of
Birth
Control,
(May
2,
2022)
https://www.thecut.com/2022/05/business-of-birth-control-documentary-review.html.
126 HUMANAE VITAE (July 25, 1968), Paragraph 16 https://www.vatican.va/content/paulvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae.html (“the Church teaches
that married people may then take advantage of the natural cycles immanent in the reproductive
system and engage in marital intercourse only during those times that are infertile, thus
controlling birth in a way which does not in the least offend the moral principles which We have
just explained…”).
127 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, An Analysis of Diocesan Marriage
Preparation Policies, https://www.usccb.org/topics/marriage-and-family-life-ministries/principlesministry-couples-preparing-marriage#tab--formational-programs.
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campus hospital’s pharmacy or sell condoms in the student stores128—
created and launched a natural family planning app.129
For people who menstruate but, for whatever reason, cannot use
hormonal birth control—either out of preference, contraindication, or
because it is unavailable after Dobbs—using an app to identify fertile
days can help a user know when to avoid intercourse or use other forms
of contraception to avoid pregnancy.130 Apps specifically designed to
prevent pregnancy include Natural Cycles, the first FDA-cleared
software application as contraception,131 and Clue, which obtained FDA
clearance through the 510(k) approval pathway in 2021 after
demonstrating substantial equivalence to Natural Cycles.132 The FDA
defines software application as contraception as a “device that provides
user-specific fertility information for preventing a pregnancy.”133 This
includes algorithms that analyze patient-specific data to identify fertile
and non-fertile days and provide patient-specific contraception
recommendations.134 The FDA classifies contraceptive apps as Class II
devices—the same as many common types of condoms.135
In light of this classification, the FDA requires special controls,
including performance testing to demonstrate effectiveness; human
factors performance evaluation to demonstrate intended users can selfidentify; software verification, validation, and hazard analysis; and
labeling.136 Labels must include four specific warnings and precautions:
a statement (1) that no contraceptive method is 100% effective, (2) that
another form of contraception (or abstinence) must be used on specified
days, (3) of any factors affecting the accuracy of contraceptive
information, and (4) warning that the application cannot prevent
sexually transmitted infections.137 The FDA also imposes additional
obligations, including requirements for the hardware platform and
128
H*yas
For
Choice,
Birth
Control
Coverage
@
Georgetown,
https://www.hyasforchoice.com/faqs#:~:text=Due%20to%20its%20Catholic%20affiliation,sale%20of%20condoms%20on%20campus.
129 See supra note 10. Marquette has also developed an app.
130 See Horner & Campo-Engelstein, supra note 55, at 14 (describing ovulation through the
fetal period).
131 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA allows marketing of first direct-to-consumer
app for contraceptive use to prevent pregnancy (August 10, 2018) https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/fda-allows-marketing-first-direct-consumer-app-contraceptive-useprevent-pregnancy.
132 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 510(k) Premarket notification for Clue Birth
Control https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K193330.

21 CFR § 884.5370(a).
Id.
135 The FDA classifies condoms and condoms with spermicidal lubricant as Class II devices.
21 CFR § 884.5300 and 21 CFR § 884.5310, respectively.
136 21 CFR § 884.5370(b).
137 21 CFR § 884.5370(b)(4)(i)(A-D).
133
134
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operating system, instructions identifying and explaining how to use
the app, and a summary of clinical validation studies and results,
including effectiveness as a standalone contraceptive and how that
compares to other forms of legally marketed contraceptives.138
Software as contraception will be critically important after
Dobbs. When these apps work, users have access to effective and
discreet birth control. With regular menstrual cycle monitoring, users
can know if they are pregnant the day their period is late so they can
plan for termination—especially in states with ever-shrinking windows
for legal abortions. And for those who will have to travel out of state for
care, early notification can give a user more time to plan to travel long
distances, which is often costly and logistically difficult.139
3.

Conception and Beyond

Period and fertility tracking apps are also beneficial for
consumers interested in becoming pregnant because accurately
identifying ovulation can help target intercourse on a user’s most fertile
days, thereby increasing the chances of conception.140 Though the same
information—the fertile window—is relevant to both preventing and
achieving pregnancy, the FDA currently distinguishes between apps
intended for contraception and those intended for “proception.”141 In
contrast to contraceptive devices, proceptive devices identify fertile
days but may not claim that the user can rely on this information for
contraceptive purposes.142 The FDA exercises enforcement discretion
over proceptive devices.143 Enforcement discretion means the FDA does
21 CFR § 884.5370(b)(4)(ii-iv).
Jolie McCullough & Neelam Bohra, As Texans Fill Up Abortion Clinics in Other States,
Low-Income
People
Get
Left
Behind,
TEXAS TRIBUNE
(September
3,
2021)
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/09/02/texas-abortion-out-of-state-people-of-color/.
140 Alexander Freis, Tanja Freundl-Schutt, Lisa-Maria Wallwiener, Sigfried Baur, Thomas
Strowitzki, Gunter Freundl, and Petra Frank-Hermann, Plausibility of Menstrual Cycle Apps
Claiming to Support Conceptions, 98 FRONTIERS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (2018); Carlotta Favaro, Jack
T.Pearson, Simon P. Rowland, Annie Marie Jukic, et al, Time to Pregnancy for Women Using a
Fertility Awareness Based Mobile Application to Plan a Pregnancy, 30 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 1538
(2021); Pippa Grenfell, Nerissa Tilouche, Jill Shawe, and Rebecca S. French, Fertility and Digital
Technology: Narratives of Using Smartphone App ‘Natural Cycles’ While Trying To Conceive, 43
SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 116 (2021).
141
U.S.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMINISTRATION
Product
Classification
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPCD/classification.cfm?ID=LHD.
Apps
associated with wearables are more likely to accurately predict fertile windows and ovulation.
Tracy Y. Zhu et. al. Accuracy of a Wrist-Worn Medical Device To Identify Fertile Windows and
Ovulation Day, ASRM Abstracts 116:3 (September 2021).
142 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
143 Examples of Software Functions for Which the FDA will Exercise Enforcement Discretion,
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-software138
139
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not plan to enforce otherwise applicable regulatory requirements or
expect a developer to submit a 510(k) so long as they do not cross the
limits of exemptions.144 The FDA retains post-market authority even if
it has exercised enforcement discretion over a device.145
Accurate and effective proceptive apps are helpful for anyone
interested in facilitating conception and menstruation tracking more
generally. However, they potentially have an increasingly important
role to play in a post-Dobbs world where pregnancy surveillance
increases alongside the state’s interest in the potential life and health
of the fetus. When proceptive apps work well, they help consumers be
the good “digitized reproductive citizens” envisioned by the quantifiedself movement.146 These consumers will know they are pregnant early,
potentially the exact day the app alerts them to a late period, and,
therefore, seek prenatal care quickly and modify behaviors to support
the health of the fetus. Early changes can help avoid civil and criminal
penalties for real or perceived fetal-harming behaviors. In other words,
these users could do everything in their power to ensure they have a
healthy baby.147
Given period and fertility tracking apps’ diverse potential
benefits beyond contraception and conception,148 it is no surprise that
as many as one-third of U.S. women track their fertility or menstrual
cycle using an app.149 In a post-Dobbs world, many more people may
functions-including-mobile-medical-applications/examples-software-functions-which-fda-willexercise-enforcement-discretion (last visited 02/05/2022).
144 21 CFR § 884.9.
145 Policy for Device Software Functions and Mobile Medical Applications, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidancedocuments/policy-device-software-functions-and-mobile-medical-applications (last updated Sept.
27, 2019).
146 Deborah Lupton, D, 'Mastering your fertility': the digitised reproductive citizen. In A.
McCosker, S. Vivienne, & A. Johns (Eds.), Negotiating Digital Citizenship: Control, Contest and
Culture (pp. 81-93). London: Rowman & Littlefield. (2016).
147 See supra note 79; Deborah Lupton, ‘Precious Cargo’: Foetal Subjects, Risk, and
Reproductive Citizenship, 22 CRITICAL PUBLIC HEALTH 2, 337 (September 2012).
148 Consumers may wish to anticipate menstruation dates to plan activities and vacations or
purchase menstrual products before bleeding. They are also useful for monitoring health
conditions that fluctuate with hormones, such as migraines, mood, and athletic performance.
Andrea Ford, Guilia Togni, and Livia Miller, Hormonal Health: Period Tracking Apps, Wellness,
and Self-Management in the Era of Surveillance Capitalism, 7 ENGAGING SCI. TECH & SOC. 48, 49
(2021). Consumers may wish to use the data to inform conversations with their medical providers
or simply want to know their bodies a little better. Johanna Levy and Nuria Romo-Aviles, “A Good
Little Tool to Get to Know Yourself a Bit Better”: A Qualitative Study on User’s Experiences of AppSupported Menstrual Tracking in Europe, 19 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1213 (2019); Bianca supra note
100; Michael Morrison, The Datafication of Fertility and Reproductive Health: Menstrual Cycle
Tracking Apps and Ovulation Detection Algorithms, 11 J. RESEARCH IN GENDER STUDIES 139
(2021).
149 Donna Rosato, What Your Period Tracker App Knows About You, CONSUMER REPORTS
(January 28, 2020) https://www.consumerreports.org/health-privacy/what-your-period-tracker-
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turn to period and fertility apps to meet menstrual and reproductive
health needs. And as reproductive intentions—and consequently the
motivation for app use150—change over time, this routinized tracking
has the potential to help all users avoid becoming part of Dobbs’s future
ruin.
II.

FEMTECH’S DYSTOPIA

On their face, period and fertility tracking apps offer promising
solutions to increase bodily autonomy at a time when the outlook for
reproductive rights is increasingly bleak. But these technologies are
also dangerous. This Part forecasts femtech’s dystopian future. It then
turns to the regulatory and legal environment to explore how current
conditions not only fail to prevent the worst possible outcomes but may
actively facilitate them.
A. Femtechnodystopia
For period and fertility tracking apps to preserve bodily
autonomy and reproductive freedom, they must be accurate, the data
must be private and secure, and consumers must know about the risks
and limitations of app use. But these conditions are, at best, imperfectly
satisfied and, at worst, completely unmet. As a result, ineffective period
and fertility tracking apps may increase pregnancy rates, and insecure
apps may augment reproductive surveillance.
1.

Inaccurate Apps

Most proceptive period and fertility tracking apps are
ineffective.151 Study after study reveals that apps struggle to make
app-knows-about-you-a8701683935/ (citing KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Health Apps and
Information Survey September 2019, https://files.kff.org/attachment/Topline-Health-Apps-andInformation-Survey-September-2019).
150 Sarah Earle, Hannah R. Marston, Robin Hadley, and Duncan Banks, Use of Menstruation
and Fertility App Trackers: A Scoping Review of the Evidence, 47 BMJ SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH 90, 101 (2021) (concluding that “motivations for fertility app use are varied, overlap and
change over time.”).
151 Britt Lunde et al., An Evaluation of Contraception Education and Health Promotion
Applications for Patients, 27 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 29, 34 (2017); Moglia et. al. supra note 109,
at 1153-55; Duane et al., supra note 97; Sarah Johnson, Lorrae Marriott & Michael Zinamen, Can
Apps and Calendar Methods Predict Ovulation with Accuracy? 34 CURRENT MEDICAL RESEARCH
AND OPINION 1587 (2018); Lauren Worsfold, Lorrae Marriott, Sarah Johnson, and Joyce C. Harper,
Period Tracker Applications: What Menstrual Cycle Information Are They Giving Women? 17
WOMEN’S HEALTH 1 (2021); Lauren Worsfold, Lorrae Marriott, Sarah Johnson, & Joyce C. Harper,
P-469 Period Tracker Applications—are they giving women accurate menstrual cycle information?
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accurate predictions, especially when synthesizing irregular menstrual
cycle data.152 Many apps only evaluate menstrual cycle dates, even
though it is impossible to know if someone is ovulating using this
outdated approach.153 Some studies put the accuracy of certain types of
ovulation prediction at no greater than 21%.154 Other research has had
to exclude identified apps from the study sample for containing
inaccurate information.155 An even more recent study that purported to
show impressive app-specific efficacy data156 was retracted157 after
subsequent research questioned data collection and analysis.158
The lack of evidence base is unsurprising. Recall that, though
the FDA regulates software as contraception, it exercises enforcement
discretion over proceptive apps because it considers them low risk. As a
result, most apps do not have to demonstrate accuracy before going to
market. However, just because an app does not market itself as
contraception does not mean a consumer will appreciate the distinction
and not use it for contraceptive purposes.159

HUMAN REPRODUCTION 36 Supp 1 (July 2021) (finding that the top 10 period trackers gave
conflicting information on period dates, ovulation day, and the fertile window); Roshonara Ali,
Zeynep B. Gürtin, & Joyce C. Harper, Do fertility tracking applications offer women useful
information about their fertile window? 42 REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 273 (2021)
(finding that 54.4% of apps included in a sample of 90 used only calendar dates to predict ovulation,
which the author notes is “impossible.”).
152 See Worsfold et al. supra note 152, at 7 (showing that apps struggle to make predictions
when presented with irregular menstrual cycle data); Duane et al., supra note 101, at 508 (noting
that as many as 25% of women have irregular periods and those rates only increase with body
mass index and stress).
153 Bull, supra note 102; Ali et. al., supra note 151, at 277.
154 Johnson et. al., supra note 151, at 1587-94 (finding “Accuracy of ovulation prediction was
no better than 21% by the apps”).
155 Lunde et al., supra note 151, at 34 (“More than one-third of identified apps were excluded
from this review for containing inaccurate information.”); Moglia et. Al., supra note 109, at 115355 (noting that of the 108 apps that fit the study criteria, 88 apps were eliminated due to the
inclusion of misinformation and other inaccuracies).
156 Martin C. Koch et. Al., Improving Usability and Pregnancy Rates of a Fertility Monitor By
And Additional Mobile Application: Results of A Retrospective Efficacy Study of Daysy and
DaysyView App, 15 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 37 (2018).
157 Retraction Note: Improving Usability and Pregnancy Rates of a Fertility Monitor By
And Additional Mobile Application: Results of A Retrospective Efficacy Study of Daysy and
DaysyView App, 16 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 54 (2019).
158 Chelsea B. Polis, Published Analysis of Contraceptive Effectiveness of Daysy and
DaysyView App is Fatally Flawed, 15 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 113 (2018).
159 Katie Palmer, How Will Doctors Talk To Patients About Contraception Apps Like Natural
Cycles and Clue, STAT NEWS (March 12, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/03/12/doctorstalk-contraception-apps-natural-cycles-clue/ (“Brayboy said the impetus for creating Clue’s
upcoming feature was the company’s discovery that 20% of its users were using the menstrual
tracking app for birth control. In late February, Clue removed a feature called the “fertile window”
that could have encouraged users to employ the uncleared app as birth control; now, they can only
see their predicted day of ovulation.”).
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Further, many period trackers are not founded on evidencebased methods of fertility-awareness-based family planning.160 Even
when they are, these methods can have as poor as an 11-34% failure
rate with typical use,161 which is about as effective as the withdrawal
method.162 And because these apps often lack necessary instructions or
educational components, many people will not understand their
nuances—such as variables that invalidate a basal body temperature
reading, like stress, travel, alcohol consumption, and sleep—further
reducing their effectiveness.163 And this, of course, does not account for
users who have no say in if, when, how, or with whom they participate
in intercourse capable of producing a pregnancy, for whom even the
most perfect app will do nothing.164 Thus, increased app uptake as a
standalone form of birth control, especially for consumers who conflate
contraceptive and proceptive apps, will inevitably result in more
unintended pregnancies.
2.

Bleeding Data

The fact that these apps are often inaccurate is not surprising
when you consider that the point for most is not to be effective at
achieving advertised outcomes but to monetize user data.165 And there
is a lot of data to monetize. In light of the physiological signs of
ovulation necessary to generate predictions, the scope of this data
collection can include the lengths and specific dates of menstrual cycles
and ovulation.166 More than date ranges or points on a calendar, the
data collection can become intensely intimate. Some data raises no
more red flags than a diet tracker, including height, weight, food, and
160 See Duane et al., supra note 98, at508 (observing that “The majority of fertility apps are
neither designed for avoiding pregnancy nor founded on evidence based FABMs.”).
161 See Urrutia & Polis, supra note 122.
162 Id.
163 Duane et al., supra note 97 (concluding that “Relying solely on an app to use an FABM,
without appropriate training in the method, may not be sufficient to prevent pregnancy”). See also
Nicole Wetsman, Why You Should Not Trust Fertility Apps - Yet, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/09/fertility-apps-birth-control-evidence.html (“The quality of the
evidence around fertility awareness apps is a particular concern because most people using them
probably don’t have prior exposure to the science around fertility awareness methods or realize
what they actually need to do in order to use them properly.”). But see Bianca, supra note 100 at
9-10 (describing the results of qualitative interviews in which users did not consider apps to be the
singular authoritative position on ovulation and instead engaged in other confirmatory
measures—like urine test strips—to confirm an app’s prediction).
164 See supra note 100, at 17.
165 Marielle S. Gross, Amelia Hood, and Bethany Corbin, Pay No Attention to That Man
Behind the Curtain: An Ethical Analysis of the Monetization of Menstruation App Data, 14 IJFAB:
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 144 (2021).
166 See Shipp & Blasco, supra note 96, at 504.
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exercise.167 Other data collection can include the position of a user’s
cervix (high, soft & open, low, hard & closed)168 and characteristics of
vaginal discharge and cervical mucus, including color, texture, and
odor. Some apps ask about symptoms, like tender breasts or cramps,
and want to know if a user is happy, stressed, calm, or tired.169 Apps
want to know if a user got sick or used medications.170 It can also include
data about sexual activity, including the time and dates of intercourse,
libido, sexual position, condom use, and whether the user or their sexual
partner orgasmed (or faked it).171 Some apps ask if users consumed
alcohol or other substances172 or track “partying” as activity data.173
Other apps allow users to share their account information with a sexual
partner, presumably to plan intercourse.174 And some consumers—
particularly adolescents—also use this account sharing feature to share
menstrual data with friends for support and connection.175 Data sets
may also explicitly176 or implicitly177 include information about dates of
abortions and miscarriages. And, when factoring in free-form text a
user enters into discussion threads or notes sections, available user
data is limited only by the consumer’s willingness to share.178

167 Sadaf Khan, Data Bleeding Everywhere: A Story of Period Trackers, DEEP DIVES (June 7,
2019) https://deepdives.in/data-bleeding-everywhere-a-story-of-period-trackers-8766dc6a1e00.
168 Id.
169 Id. (including screenshots of Glow Eve’s user interface).
170 Id.
171 Jerry Beilinson, Glow Pregnancy App Exposed Women to Privacy Threats, Consumer
Reports Find, CONSUMER REP. (July 28, 2016), https://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-securitysoftware/glowpregnancy-app-exposed-women-to-privacy-threats; See also Shipp and Blasco supra
note 96 at 491.
172 Privacy International, No Body’s Business But Mine: How Menstruation Apps Are Sharing
Your Data, (October 7, 2020) https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3196/no-bodys-businessmine-how-menstruations-apps-are-sharing-your-data.
173 Privacy International, We Asked Five Menstruation Apps For Our Data And Here Is What
We Found, (December 4, 2020) https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/4316/we-asked-fivemenstruation-apps-our-data-and-here-what-we-found (reporting on a Data Subject Access
Request and displaying entries that described bowel movements, partying, and whether the user
took their birth control pills).
174 Karen E. C. Levy, Intimate Surveillance, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 679 (2015); Lauren Goode, Max
Levchin’s New Plan: To Get You Pregnant (And Improve Health Care in the Process), ALL
THINGS D (May 29, 2013, 11:14 AM), http://allthingsd.com/20130529/max-levchinsnew-plan-toget-you-pregnant-and-improve-health-care-in-the-process/ (“the app might remind a woman on an
especially fertile day that it’s a good time to wear nice underwear. Her partner might receive a
notification on the same day to bring flowers home.”).
175 Leah R. Fowler, Charlotte Gillard, Stephanie R. Morain, Teenage Use of Smartphone
Applications for Menstrual Cycle Tracking, 145 PEDIATRICS 2019 (2020).
176 Ali et. al., supra note 151, at 279 (finding that 2 apps in a sample of 90 tracked information
about miscarriage).
177 If a user has a missed period and then several weeks later resumes menstruating, this
data could imply an abortion or a miscarriage.
178 See supra note 167 (discussing how discussion forums also count as data).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4099764

DRAFT DO NOT CITE

7/18/22 5:10 PM

FEMTECHNODYSTOPIA

30

Period and fertility tracking data are already shared and sold,
and they are exceptionally valuable. Research suggests that a pregnant
person’s data is worth fifteen times that of the average person.179 And
this says nothing of the obvious value these data have for abusive
partners180 and hackers who may need little more than a user’s email
address to access deeply personal information.181 Thus, as app use
increases, so too does the pool of available menstrual data, and bad
actors will use these data for reproductive surveillance regardless of a
user’s intention to terminate or carry the pregnancy to term.
3.

Consumer Ignorance

Increased reliance on period and fertility trackers as birth
control will likely lead to unintended pregnancies from ineffective apps
and user error and greater risks for more people for the data these tools
contain. Unfortunately, consumers are not well-positioned to
understand the limits of accuracy and privacy.182 This is due, in part, to
how apps convey (or remain silent about) this information.183
Developers commonly include pertinent information—such as medical
disclaimers, limitations on liability, fitness descriptions for specific
purposes, and statements about data sharing and protection—in terms
of service and privacy policies. These digital documents are subject to
valid criticisms for being difficult to find and understand184 and are
frequently subject to unilateral change.185 Medical disclaimers may be
obscured by legal jargon and passive voice or hidden at the bottom of

See supra note 172.
See Levy, supra note 174, at 686-87.
181 See supra note 171.
182 See supra note 167. (describing interviews with period and fertility tracker users in which
they did not understand the limits of privacy or efficacy and doubting anyone would have any use
for the data they log).
183 See Ali et. al., supra note 151, at (finding that in a study of 90 apps, only 10% advised
against the use of their app as contraception and only 35% state that their app was not a medical
device and thus should not be used for medical purposes).
184 Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service Agreements, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017), www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-terms-ofservice-without-reading-2017-11 (finding 91% of consumers consent to legal terms and services
conditions without reading them, rising to 97% for people ages 18-34); Ali Sunyaev et al.,
Availability and Quality of Mobile Health App Privacy Policies, 22 J. AM. MED. INFORM. ASSOC.
e28, e31 (2015); Nili Steinfeld, "I Agree to the Terms and Conditions": (How) do Users Read Privacy
Policies Online? an Eye-Tracking Experiment, 55 COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAV. 992 (2016);
Leah R. Fowler et al., Readability and Accessibility of Terms of Service and Privacy Policies for
Menstruation-Tracking Smartphone Applications, HEALTH PROM. PRAC., Feb. 2020.
185 Leah R. Fowler, Jim Hawkins, and Jessica L. Roberts, Uncertain Terms, 97 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1 (2021); Jessica L. Roberts & Jim Hawkins, When Health Tech Companies Change Their
Terms of Service, 367 SCIENCE 745, 745 (2020).
179
180

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4099764

DRAFT DO NOT CITE

7/18/22 5:10 PM

FEMTECHNODYSTOPIA

31

already tedious documents.186 And research reveals that many privacy
policies treat the intimate data contained in period and fertility apps no
differently than any other consumer information.187 Some privacy
policies do not even contemplate the use and management of
reproductive data at all.188
Worse, the content in terms of service and privacy policies often
contradicts other highly visible marketing and product designs.189 For
example, a previous FDA investigation into one proceptive app revealed
a section of the website that stated “if [users] no longer want to use the
pill, IUDs and similar methods” and “find contraception with condoms
or diaphragms bothersome,” then “natural family planning with [the
app] offers many advantages and absolutely no disadvantages.”190 Even
visual cues like using the color green to indicate “not fertile” and red to
indicate “fertile” suggest use as contraception, regardless of warranties
or disclaimers. But despite its investigation, the FDA did not require
the app to submit a 510(k), only that it limit its marketing. In light of
the stark contrast between an app interface and marketing language
the user sees and the terms of service they almost certainly did not read,
it is no wonder that consumers do not appreciate the risks.
4.

A Period Panopticon

It is convenient to think an app could provide an easy solution
to the problems Dobbs creates. But that view discounts the additional
risks apps create when they do not work as advertised, the data are not
secure, and people are ill-informed of the risks. Instead of empowering
self-surveillance, period and fertility tracking apps may merely put
users in a femtechnodystopic panopticon.191 It is not just that we are
reverting to a pre-Roe world, but that we are doing so with technology
in place that would have been unfathomable in 1973.192 As a result,
these apps will become increasingly relevant as states restrict access to
contraception and conduct reproductive surveillance.
186 See Leah R. Fowler et al., supra note 184, at 4 (reporting that one app would require nearly
85 scrolls on an iPhone 8 to read to completion).
187 See Shipp & Blasco, supra note 96, at 504-05.
188 Id. at 491.
189 Memo, FDA. (on file with authors).
190 Id. (emphasis added).
191 The panopticon is a reference to a prison structure first invented by Jeremy Bentham and
later expanded as a symbol of everyday social control by Michel Foucault. See generally Jeremy
Bentham THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (1787); Michel Foucault DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH
OF THE PRISON (1975).
192 Elizabeth Joh, The Potential Overturn of Roe Shows Why We Need More Digital Privacy
Protections, SLATE (May 9, 2022) https://slate.com/technology/2022/05/roe-overturn-data-privacylaws.html.
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The Court in Dobbs identified societal, legal, and medical shifts
that the Court concludes would render abortion access nonessential.
The Court may also consider technological advancements in software as
contraception as justification for allowing restrictions on more
objectional forms of birth control—like those at issue in Hobby Lobby.193
But even if we do not see femtech as an argument for greater
restrictions on other forms of contraception, the possible nefarious uses
for the data these technologies contain will inevitably expand after
Dobbs. Law enforcement in states with more aggressive restrictions
may be interested in preventing abortions or arresting those suspected
of having self-induced or otherwise illegal abortions. Indeed, online
behaviors—including Google search history—have already been used as
evidence of criminal intent in cases involving “suspicious” miscarriages,
and prosecutor reliance on these digital trails will likely only
intensify.194 Menstrual trackers can reveal a possible abortion when
data show a late period that later resumes, particularly if it resumes
after location data confirm a consumer crossed state lines to a
jurisdiction where abortion is legal. While unusual menstrual data
patterns can mean many things, like irregular periods or simply
inconsistent tracking, bad data are not a hurdle to raising law
enforcement suspicion or prosecution.
Some apps already disclaim that they share information with
law enforcement in their privacy policies, and all do so in response to
legally obtained warrants.195 Using menstrual cycles to estimate how
far a pregnancy has gestated, period and fertility tracking data could
effectuate current and evolving enforcement mechanisms for evershrinking windows for legal abortion.196 Indeed, menstrual data has
already been relevant to abortion restrictions. Missouri previously used
spreadsheets of patients’ period data in investigations of Planned
Parenthood and so-called “failed abortions.”197 And Immigration and
Customs Enforcement under the Trump Administration also tracked
menstrual cycles to stop migrants from obtaining lawful abortions.198
See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
Cynthia Conti-Cook, Surveilling the Digital Abortion Diary, 50 U. BALTIMORE L. REV. 1
(2020) (discussing Rodgers v. State, 166 So. 3d 537, 547 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)).
195 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018).
196 Oliver Kim & Tamara Kramer, The Girl with the Cyber Tattoo: Applying a Gender Equity
Lens to Emerging Health Technology, 12 NORTHEASTERN U. L. REV. 1, 327, 356-57 (2020).
197 Yasmeen Abutaleb & Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Missouri reviewed data about Planned
Parenthood’s patients, including their periods, to identify failed abortions, THE WASHINGTON POST
(November
30,
2019)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/missouri-tracked-plannedparenthood-patients-periods-in-spreadsheet-top-health-official-says/2019/10/30/e96791d0-fb4211e9-ac8c-8eced29ca6ef_story.html.
198 Jennifer Wright, The U.S. Is Tracking Migrant Girls’ Periods to Stop Them From Getting
Abortions,
HARPER’S
BAZAAR
(April
2,
2019)
193
194
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Period and fertility tracking apps simply make those data significantly
easier to obtain and exploit at scale.
But it could get even worse. For example, some period and
fertility tracking apps allow users to input information about substance
use—like if and when a user consumed alcohol.199 It (or other apps or
social media) may even indicate more mundane but nevertheless
potentially fetal-harming activities, such as whether the pregnant
person consumed unsafe foods.200 Period and fertility tracking apps,
alongside other methods of technological self-surveillance, enhance
normative expectations of discipline that frequently accompany
increasing control of an individual’s reproductive rights.201 And that
data could be used to police pregnant people or as evidence of guilt in
the case of a suspicious miscarriage or stillbirth. And such a scenario is
not a stretch because gradations of this problem exist now and have
long existed with Roe and Casey in place. It is not such a stretch from
one fetal-harming behavior to the next when we are already willing to
arrest people for, among other things, falling down while pregnant,202
using legal (and illegal) substances,203 giving birth at home,204 refusing
a cesarean section,205 or ignoring a physician’s recommendation for bed
rest.206 Period and fertility tracking apps, alone or analyzed in
conjunction with other smartphone data, just expand the limits of what
can realistically be criminalized and substantiated.207
https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/politics/a26985261/trump-administration-abortionperiod-tracking-migrant-women/.
199 See supra note 172.
200 Kira Proehl, Pregnancy Crimes: New Worries to Expect When You’re Expecting, 53 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 2 (2013).
201 See supra note 114, at 98.
202 Robin Levinson-King, US women are being jailed for having miscarriages, BBC NEWS
(November 12, 2021) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-59214544.
203 Cecilia Nowell, She Used Drugs While Pregnant. Should She Be in Prison? THE CUT
(September 20, 2021) https://www.thecut.com/2021/09/feature-adora-perez-stillbirth-prison.html;
Cecilia Nowell, A Mom Was Charged With Child Neglect For Using Medical Marijuana While
Pregnant. The Arizona Case Could Set a Precedent. THE LILY (September 13, 2021)
https://www.thelily.com/a-mom-was-charged-with-child-neglect-for-using-medical-marijuanawhile-pregnant-the-arizona-case-could-set-a-precedent/; Cecilia Nowell, Kim Blalock Took
Lawfully Prescribed Pain Killers During Pregnancy—and Was Charged With A Felony, ELLE (April
6,
2022)
https://www.elle.com/culture/a39541235/kim-blalock-took-lawfully-prescribed-painkillers-during-pregnancyand-was-charged-with-a-felony/.
204 See supra note 202.
205 Mother Who Avoided C-Section Gets Probation, LA TIMES (April 30, 2004)
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-apr-30-na-briefs30.3-story.html.
206 Susan Donaldson James, Pregnant Woman Fights Court Ordered Bed Rest, ABC NEWS
(January 14, 2010) https://abcnews.go.com/Health/florida-court-orders-pregnant-woman-bed-restmedical/story?id=9561460#.UB_djfvQgcu.
207 Shoshana Wodinsky, Your Phone Is a Goldmine of Hidden Data for Cops. Here’s How to
Fight Back, GIZMODO (June 2, 2020) https://gizmodo.com/your-phone-is-a-goldmine-of-hiddendata-for-cops-heres-1843817740; See also Logan Koepke, Emma Weil, Urmila Janardan, Tinuola
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Finally, the data period and fertility trackers contain, especially
in combination with location data208 or search history,209 have obvious
appeal to the latest legislative developments in civil actions against
those performing or aiding and abetting abortions—even if the abortion
occurs across state lines—opening the risks beyond those who are
pregnant.210 And recall that some period and fertility tracking apps
have functionalities where users can share menstrual data with
intimate partners and friends.211 In these circumstances, for example,
an abusive partner interested in capitalizing on enforcement bounties
would not even need to be an experienced hacker because the data
would already be available in their synced companion account.212
These risks are not evenly distributed. Those with the most to
lose after Dobbs also have the most to lose in femtech’s dystopian future.
The cost of an evidence-based app suitable for contraceptive purposes
is nontrivial.213 Natural Cycles costs $89.99 per year for an annual
subscription or $9.99 per month plus $14.50 for their basal
thermometer.214 When considering this expense compared to a free and
visually identical but non-evidence-based proceptive app, it is clear that
many consumers—especially those from disadvantaged groups—will
unknowingly end up with less effective and less secure apps.
To summarize, period and fertility tracking apps are plagued
with efficacy and privacy problems, and users are often in the dark
about their vulnerabilities. Here, femtech’s story is not one of promise
and self-empowerment but of profound peril for privacy, autonomy, and
Dada and Harlan Yu, Mass Extraction: The Widespread Power of U.S. Law Enforcement to Search
Mobile Phones, (October 20, 2020) https://www.upturn.org/work/mass-extraction/.
208 Anya E.R. Prince, Location as Health, 21 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43 (2021); Joseph
Cox, Data Broker is Selling Location Data of People Who Visit Abortion Clinics, Vice (May 3, 2022)
https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7vzjb/location-data-abortion-clinics-safegraph-plannedparenthood.
209 Lil Kalish, Meet Abortion Bans’ New Best Friend - Your Phone, Mother Jones (February
16, 2022) https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/02/meet-abortion-bans-new-best-friendyour-phone/.
210 Alice Miranda Ollstein and Megan Messery, Missouri wants to stop out-of-state abortions.
Other
states
could
follow.
Politico
(March
19,
2022)
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/19/travel-abortion-law-missouri-00018539.
211 See supra note 175.
212 See Ali et al., supra note 151 (finding that 42% of the 90 apps included in the sample
“allowed users to share their tracked information with others, i.e. their doctor, partner, or anyone
else”).
213 But see Rhonda Zwingerman, Michael Chiakof, & Claire Jones, A Critical Appraise of
Menstrual Tracking Apps for the iPhone, 42 J. OBSTETRICS AND GYNAECOLOGY CANADA 5 (May
2020) (finding no statistically significant difference in app quality scores between paid and free
apps).
214 Natural Cycles, signup.naturalcycles.com (listing the annual subscription price as $89.99);
Basal Thermometer from Natural Cycles https://www.naturalcycles.com/shop/basal-thermometerfahrenheit. Data about Clue’s pricing is not yet available.
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personal sovereignty.215 Looming on the horizon are even more
terrifying possibilities. Faced with fewer options for hormonal birth
control, the use of period and fertility tracking apps as a form of
contraception—as well as unintended pregnancies—may only increase.
The data they contain could then, in turn, be used to support criminal
and civil actions against pregnant people or those assisting in an
abortion. Apps would ensure that people are “good reproductive
citizens,”216 and the data they contain would support or refute whether
a person did “everything in [their] power to ensure that [they’d] have a
healthy baby.”217 And while this possible dystopia is not a foregone
conclusion, current laws and regulations are ill-equipped to stop it.
B. Regulatory & Legal Shortcomings
Despite a growing body of scientific literature and popular press
attention to the dangers of period and fertility trackers, the current
regulatory and legal environment does little to remedy the problems of
accuracy, privacy, and consumer understanding. That is not to say it
does nothing at all. But incomplete regulatory solutions and concerning
legal trends may create the illusion of protection while simultaneously
exacerbating the problems that over-reliance on these products and the
harvesting of their data can create.
1.

Regulatory Gaps

Considering how the FDA and FTC have investigated and taken
action against period and fertility tracking app developers reveals the
core shortcomings of these approaches. First, current regulations are
reactive, occurring only after apps have already harmed consumers.
Second, the FDA and FTC presently intervene on a case-by-case basis,
making meaningful market-wide changes impossible. These
inadequacies leave consumers vulnerable.
The FDA has authority over apps that qualify as medical
devices, including apps intended to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or
prevent disease without depending on the body’s own metabolism.218
The definition of device notably excludes any health apps intended to

215 IT for Change, Feminist Digital Justice, Data Subjects in the Femtech Matrix: A Feminist
Political Economy Analysis of the Global Menstruapp Market, Issue Paper 6, at 8 (December 2021).
216 See supra notes 112-17.
217 See supra note 79.
218 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
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maintain or encourage a healthy lifestyle.219 This authority includes the
ability to require pre-market notification220 and approval,221 implement
quality system regulation,222 and request post-market studies.223 Recall
that the FDA regulates some period and fertility trackers as software
as contraception, but to date, only two apps have obtained clearance for
marketing as contraception.224 The FDA exercises enforcement
discretion over proceptive apps, which comprise the rest of the market,
and these apps are only investigated after complaints to ensure that
design, marketing, and other statements do not trip the exemptions.225
If the FDA’s investigation reveals potentially inappropriate
marketing in violation of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), FDA can send letters to industry asking a developer to change
its marking or submit for clearance or approval.226 Often this is
sufficient. But anyone—including app developers—could theoretically
challenge or ignore FDA rules, letters, or guidance.227 If this happens,
the FDA has little of its own muscle other than sternly worded
communication, beyond which the FDA must convince the Department
of Justice to litigate.228 A tall order for a department with competing
legal and political priorities.229
219 21 U.S.C. §360j(o)(1)(A)-(E)) (The 21st Century Cures Act also excludes four other types of
apps from the definition of medical device, including those that provide administrative support for
a health care facility; serve as electronic patient records; transfer, store, or display data for
converting data formats; and provide limited clinical decision support).
220 21 C.F.R. Part 807 Subpart E.
221 21 C.F.R. Part 814.
222 21 C.F.R. Part 820.
223 Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments: Legislative Background, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/postmarket-requirements-andcommitments/postmarketing-requirements-and-commitments-legislative-background
(last
updated June 14, 2018).
224 See supra notes 131-38.
225 See supra notes 143-45.
226 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Letters to Industry https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/industry-medical-devices/letters-industry.
227 C. Joseph Ross Daval, Litigating Authority for the FDA, Wash. U. L. Rev (Forthcoming
2022) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4046934 at 4.
228 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2018) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in
which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing
evidence therefore, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the
Attorney General.”); 28 U.S.C. § 519 (2018) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney
General shall supervise all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a
party . . .”); 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (2018) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the head of an
Executive department . . . may not employ an attorney or counsel for the conduct of litigation . . .
but shall refer the matter to the Department of Justice.”); John R. Fleder, The Role of the
Department of Justice in Enforcement Matters Relating to the Food and Drug Administration, 46
FOOD, DRUG, COSMETIC L. J. 6 (1991) (describing the DOJ’s role in FDA enforcement actions).
229 See supra note 227 (finding that “DOJ control of FDA litigation in fact shapes FDA policy,
with the interview responses centering around three main themes. First, DOJ’s final say-so limits
FDA’s preferred implementation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the main statute
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Though the FDA could theoretically consider any relevant
source of information when determining a product’s intended use,230 for
now, the FDA is primarily concerned with “labeling claims, advertising
materials, or oral or written statements by a manufacturer or their
representative.”231 But just because an app developer and the FDA do
not believe marketing and design evince that a product is intended to
be used as contraception does not mean a consumer will agree. In fact,
consumers may regularly use proceptive apps as contraception.232
Before obtaining FDA clearance via the 510(k) approval pathway, Clue
market research revealed that 20% of consumers already used Clue’s
app for contraceptive purposes even though they did not advertise this
functionality.233 Given that consumer health apps lack even the modest
protections of having a physician intermediary that might otherwise be
present for prescription pharmaceuticals and other medical devices
used as part of medical care, the FDA’s current approaches are
ineffective at regulating proceptive apps, leaving most apps untouched
and permitting consumer misperceptions and misuse to persist.
But policing period and fertility tracking apps is not solely the
FDA’s responsibility. The FDA shares oversight of health apps with the
FTC, but each focus on separate conduct.234 The FTC’s mission includes
protecting consumers and promoting competition, which includes
regulating privacy, security, and health claims in advertising. 235 Under
Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC regulates unfair and deceptive acts
or practices.236 Under Section 12-15, the FTC prohibits disseminating
any false or misleading advertisement.237 The FTC requires that claims
in advertising are “truthful, cannot be deceptive or unfair, and must be
FDA is tasked with administering. Participants described how DOJ sometimes declined to pursue
FDA cases, or delayed filing them. The agencies regularly disagree over what kinds of arguments
to make, whether to appeal adverse judgments, and other litigation decisions. Furthermore, the
expectation of DOJ review shapes FDA referrals to align more with DOJ priorities.” And “the
agencies have distinct enforcement priorities. Although there is overlap, FDA tends to prioritize
health and safety violations, while DOJ tends to favor promotional cases, such as prosecutions for
illegal marketing of drugs and devices for indications not approved by FDA (“off-label”
promotion)”).
230 86 Fed. Reg. 41383 (Aug. 2, 2021).
231 See supra note 145.
232 Darius Tahir, Fertility Tracking Apps: Popular, Hyped—and Often Inaccurate, POLITICO
(July 20, 2019 at 12:15PM EDT) available at https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/10/fertilitytracking-apps-popular-hyped-and-often-inaccurate-1563598.
233 See supra note 159.
234 Solomon Center for Health Law and Policy at Yale Law School and Strathmore Health
Strategy, A Path to Patient-Centered Digital Health Regulation (Ryan Knox and Cara Tenenbaum,
eds.) (July 2021), 9.
235 What We Do, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last
visited May 9, 2021).
236 15 U.S.C. § 45.
237 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-55.
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evidence-based.”238 Section 13(b) authorizes the FTC to file suit to
enjoin an act or practice that violates these provisions.239
The FTC can even engage in rulemaking, albeit a burdensome
and difficult process.240 In fact, the ability of the FTC, or any agency, to
regulate through rulemaking has been made more difficult with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection
Agency.241 Here the Court ushered in the era of the “major questions
doctrine,” which limits agency power to act in areas of “economic and
political significance” unless Congress clearly grants such authority.242
Thus, at first blush, the FTC appears well-positioned to improve both
efficacy and privacy in the period and fertility tracking app market and
perhaps already on its way to meaningful change. But, much like the
FDA, FTC’s approaches in the femtech space are currently reactive and
limited to addressing reported violations on a case-by-case basis.
An example illustrates how the FTC can protect menstrual
data.243 In 2021, the FTC brought a case against Flo Health Inc.,
developer of the popular period and fertility tracking app Flo, for
breaking privacy promises to consumers.244 Specifically, Flo used thirdparty tools called software development kits that gathered user
advertising and unique identifier data.245 This user data included
descriptive “custom app events,” primarily used to improve app
functionality.246 But these custom app events also revealed
menstruation, fertility, and pregnancies.247 By allowing the third-party
software development kits to gather the custom app events, Flo violated
its statement that it would never share any data related to health.248

238 Federal Trade Commission Advertising and Marketing Basics, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/advertising-and-marketing (last
visited May 9, 2021).
239 See supra note 237, at § 53.
240 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2018); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
241 142 S.Ct. 2587 (2022).
242 Id. at 2608.
243 State attorneys general can also protect consumers in similar ways. See e.g., Press Release,
Att’y Gen. of Cal., Attorney General Becerra Announces Landmark Settlement Against Glow, Inc.
– Fertility App Risked Exposing Millions of Women’s Personal and Medical Information (Sept. 17,
2020),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-announces-landmarksettlement-against-glow-inc-%E2%80%93.
244
In
the
Matter
of
Flo
Health,
Inc,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/flo_health_complaint.pdf.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
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Further, Flo did not limit what these third-party companies could later
do with the health data they obtained.249
Importantly, the issue here was not that Flo shared health data.
As described above, period and fertility tracking apps share data all the
time.250 The problem was that Flo broke a promise to consumers. If Flo
had disclosed and used different language to describe its third-party
data-sharing practices with consumers, this type of data sharing would
be perfectly legal.251 This is because, even though many believe the law
affords health data special protections because of their sensitive nature,
it often does not. For example, data in most consumer health apps are
not generally entitled to the privacy and security assurances we expect
in other health contexts, like those involving the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
In theory, the FTC’s new aggressive approach to the Health
Breach Notification Rule (HBNR) could prove useful in filling this
health data privacy gap.252 The HBNR applies to certain businesses and
nonprofits not covered by HIPAA.253 It requires those organizations to
notify their customers, the FTC, and, in cases involving more than 500
people from one state, the media if there is a breach of unsecured,
individually identifiable health records.254 The HBNR is relevant to
period and fertility tracking apps for at least two reasons. The first is
that it defines a “personal health record” as any health record that can
be “drawn from multiple sources and that is managed, shared, and
controlled by or primarily for the individual.”255 So, for example, a
period tracking app that combines calendar data with a user’s
menstrual data is likely a personal health record.256 The second is that
the FTC intends to interpret the term “breach” to mean both hacking
as well as a company’s disclosure of covered information without the
person’s authorization.257 Here, some privacy experts believe the FTC’s
Id.
See supra note 172.
251 See supra note 185.
252 U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Complying with the FTC’s Health Breach Notification
Rule.
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-ftcs-health-breachnotification-rule (2022).
253 Theoretically a company could be subject to both HIPAA and the HBNR. The FTC provides
an example of a company that is a HIPAA business associate that also offers personal health record
services to the public. Id.
254 Id.
255 16 C.F.R. § 318.2(d) (defining “personal health record”).
256 The FTC website gives the example of a diet app that allows users to enter daily weights
and an API for pulling calorie counts from restaurant menus as an example of a covered personal
health record. U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 252.
257 See supra note 255, at § 318.2(a) (defining “breach of security”); U.S. FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, supra note 252.
249
250
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issue in the Flo case—that the developer promised not to share and then
did—counts as a breach.258
While the HBNR is good, it is not perfect. The HBNR does not
establish privacy or security standards like HIPAA does, nor does it
prohibit third-party data sharing. All it does is passively promote
encryption and incentivize developers to write privacy marketing and
policies that accurately reflect privacy practices. And, if law
enforcement is involved and determines that notification would impede
a criminal investigation, the Rule would permit delaying any
notifications—to the media, the FTC, and even the impacted
individual.259 Thus, the HBNR may prove ineffective everywhere to
address the privacy harms this Article contemplates but completely
impotent in states with the most expansive criminalization of abortion
and pregnancy-related behaviors. For a motivated municipality, like socalled “sanctuary cities for the unborn,”260 avoiding notification
requirements for an entire town is just a warrant away.
Though the FDA and the FTC appear to have the necessary tools
to police the period and fertility tracking app market, they fall short
because, at least for now, they look at apps individually and reactively,
if at all. While fixing any problem is still important, subsequent
incremental improvements will mean little to people who have already
become pregnant in a world with increased surveillance, control, and
punishment. And given resource limitations and other constraints,
relatively few apps will ever be scrutinized by the FDA or FTC.261 As a
result, consumers who have not yet been harmed will face a market
saturated with apps that have significant accuracy, privacy, and
consumer deception problems, and current regulatory approaches will
leave consumers to navigate this minefield alone.

258 Julia Kadish, National Law Review, FTC Continues to Signal Interest in Digital Health
Industry,
Publishing
Updated
Resources
(March
15,
2022)
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ftc-continues-to-signal-interest-digital-health-industrypublishing-updated.
259 See supra note 252.
260 Harmeet Kaur, Small Towns in Texas Are Declaring Themselves ‘Sanctuary Cities for the
Unborn’ CNN (January 25, 2020) https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/25/us/sanctuary-cities-for-unbornanti-abortion-texas-trnd/index.html.
261 UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REMARKS OF COMMISSIONER REBECCA
KELLY SLAUGHTER, FTC Health #12, the FTC’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, (April 10, 2019)
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1513009/slaughter_remarks_at_ftc
_approach_to_consumer_privacy_hearing_4-10-19.pdf.
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Constitutional Obstacles

The law may prove similarly ineffective in protecting consumers
of period and fertility trackers. For example, one obvious proactive
option for the government is to require a label. A warning label could
raise consumer awareness about lack of efficacy for use as birth control
and potential privacy risks. Mandating warnings of factual information
about a product is a classic public health regulation that is purely
informational, maintaining individual autonomy and choice while
placing minimal burdens on the manufacturer. This approach could
limit the impact of an app hiding pertinent information under a lengthy
and unwieldy terms of use agreement or privacy policy or simply
omitting it. It could also produce more equitable protection by
minimizing the need for high levels of health and digital literacy.
Reports indicate that the Biden Administration is interested in asking
the FTC to “push makers of apps that track menstrual cycles to warn
users that the data could be used to identify women in the early stages
of pregnancy.”262 But a mandated label’s chances of withstanding legal
challenges are increasingly unlikely.
Speech restrictions applied to commercial products typically fall
under the category of commercial speech. Historically, the law afforded
commercial speech fewer protections than standard speech—even no
protection at all for much of the country’s history.263 Over time, the
Court recognized that commercial speech is important for consumers to
make informed decisions and began to apply some First Amendment
protections.264 Now, courts evaluate commercial speech regulations
under one of two tests: the Zauderer test or the Central Hudson test.265
The Zauderer test is the least stringent, typically applying when the
government mandates accurate information that simply informs
consumer decision-making.266 Central Hudson is a more exacting
scrutiny because it evaluates a commercial speech regulation that
stems from a government viewpoint that the product or service is
262 Charlie Savage, Bracing for the End of Roe v. Wade, the White House Weighs Executive
Actions,
The
New
York
Times
(June
16,
2022)
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/us/politics/biden-abortion-roe-v-wade.html.
263 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976).
264 Id. at 765 (1976) (“Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price.”). “It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate,
be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.” Id.
265 RJ Reynolds Tobacco v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (2012).
266 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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harmful or risky.267 However, the distinction between purely factual
and government viewpoint has blurred in recent years, with the Court
finding a government viewpoint more often, more skeptical of
government interests, and more stringent about what qualifies as
accurate information.
Take, for example, the FDA’s graphic warning labels for
cigarettes, issued under a mandate from Congress in the Tobacco
Control Act.268 In upholding the labels, the Sixth Circuit determined the
warnings did “not impose any restriction on Plaintiffs’ dissemination of
speech” and did not “touch upon Plaintiffs’ core speech.”269 Instead, the
court held that the labels served as disclaimers to the public regarding
the “incontestable health consequences of using tobacco.”270 Yet, the
D.C. Circuit struck down the warning labels as “ideological” and
“subjective.”271 This determination moved the analysis from Zauderer
to Central Hudson, where the court, under the more stringent standard,
required definitive evidence that the warning labels would reduce
smoking rates.272
Beyond requiring a more stringent test, some of the dicta in the
D.C. Circuit’s opinion raise ominous questions about the limits of
compelling any warning labels. For example, the court questioned
whether the government could compel speech that would undermine a
company’s economic interests.273 Yet, warnings are always about some
potential risk and thus will dissuade some number of consumers. This
creates serious doubt about the constitutionality of all warning label
requirements on lawful products, especially considering the court also
questioned the legitimacy of a state’s interest in discouraging
consumers from using a lawful product even if there are clear adverse
health impacts.274 For period and fertility tracking apps, any type of
requirement, be it from the state or federal government, mandating
that a developer disclose that a product is neither effective—or at least
has not been proven effective—as contraception or that it sells user data
would almost certainly hit a developer’s financial bottom line.
In National Institute of Family Life Advocates v. Becerra, the
Supreme Court raised even more doubt about how warning labels for
period and fertility apps would fare.275 This case concerned Crisis
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1778 (2010).
269 674 F.3d 509, 527 (2012).
270 Id. (emphasis added).
271 RJ Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1212.
272 Id. at 1213–17.
273 Id. at 1212.
274 Id.
275 128 S.Ct. 2361 (2018).
267
268
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Pregnancy Centers (CPCs), which, by their own admission, present as
clinics providing reproductive services so pregnant women will seek
their services and staff can convince them not to obtain an abortion.276
Or, in some cases, CPC staff will purposefully delay consultation to
prolong the pregnancy with the hope that abortion will no longer be
available.277 Given this deception, California passed the Reproductive
Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act.
The Act required CPCs to post a notice that California provides free or
low-cost services, including abortion; list a phone number for more
information; and, where applicable, disclose when a CPC is not licensed
to provide medical services.278
Despite requiring indisputably factual information, the Court
held that the California law violated the First Amendment.279 The
Court reasoned that the mandated disclosure did not require “purely
factual and uncontroversial information” because it related to abortion,
which is a controversial topic.280 Never mind that the mandated
disclosure hoped to remedy CPCs’ well-known deceptive acts.
The NIFLA decision is surprising because the fact that a
mandated disclosure involves a controversial topic should have no
bearing on the analysis. As traditionally applied, Zauderer’s use of
factual and uncontroversial information pertains to whether the
information was controversial, not whether it related to a controversial
topic.281 Now, “controversial” takes on new meaning, which does not
bode well for the ability of a hypothetical mandated disclosure for period
and fertility trackers to survive a legal challenge.282 While a warning
for apps could be seen as directly related to the services they provide,
the connection to reproduction—and more importantly, its potential use
as contraception or a way to obtain an abortion before restrictions set
in—could be seen as “controversial.” And, just as CPCs misled to
achieve their ideological goals, femtech apps misleading their
consumers may not be relevant to the Court.
If this does not lead the Court to strike down a mandated
disclosure directly, it could instead apply a Central Hudson analysis.
276 Brief of 51 Reproductive Rights, Civil Rights, and Social Justice Organizations as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, National Institute of Family Life Advocates v. Becerra, 128
S.Ct. 2361 (2018).
277 Id.
278 NIFLA, 128 S.Ct. at 2368.
279 Id. at 2378.
280 Id. at 2372.
281 Id. at 2378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
282 See American Beverage Association v. City of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 761 (9th Cir.
2019) (applying NIFLA and striking down a warning about the health dangers of consuming sugarsweetened beverages in part due to its relation to a “controversial topics.”) (Ikuta, J., concurring).
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Under this standard, the government must show a substantial interest
that the law directly advances and that the restriction on commercial
speech is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.283
Again, given the current direction of the judiciary in protecting
commercial speech, there are open questions of whether the Court
would even find a substantial government interest, let alone that a
warning label directly advances it in a way that the government could
not achieve with a lesser intrusion. It may be difficult for the
government to justify infringing on First Amendment rights to protect
users who voluntarily disclose personal information to these apps. With
the relative novelty of these apps and the current lack of a warning, it
would also be difficult for the government to provide “substantial
evidence” that warnings would have a material impact on advancing
the government’s interest.284 And, if the government is so concerned,
the Court might reason, it is free to educate the public instead of forcing
speech that undermines a company’s economic interests.285
Another limitation of mandated disclosures is the potential
connection to religious beliefs. As we saw with Hobby Lobby and its
progeny, the Court has been willing to protect religious liberty above
reproductive rights in cases well beyond abortion. App developers could
claim a religious objection to any mandated disclosure because a
consumer might use the information to access abortion services or
engage in other “immoral” behavior. As we saw in Hobby Lobby, mere
belief, no matter how tenuous, could be sufficient to trigger religious
liberty protections. This type of claim would be even easier to make for
apps created by religious institutions.286
But the First Amendment is not the only relevant Amendment
when considering the unique risks of period and fertility trackers. This
is especially true when it comes to privacy and criminalization of
abortion and fetal-harming behaviors. While the Fourth Amendment
protects against arbitrary or unreasonable searches and seizures, the
pertinent question is typically whether there was a reasonable
expectation of privacy.287 Part of the problem with expecting Fourth
Amendment protection lies in how reasonableness is tied to history.288
Since Dobbs declares no historical right to abortion and courts can apply
similar reasoning to contraception,289 it would be difficult to argue for a
RJ Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1217.
Id. at 1219 (dismissing international data demonstrating potential effectiveness).
285 NIFLA, 128 S.Ct. at 2367.
286 See supra note 10.
287 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
288 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018).
289 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
283
284
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historically supported expectation of privacy for the reproductive
information these apps contain.
Meanwhile, third-party doctrine likely limits app user privacy
rights. In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held the
government did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it obtained
bank documents for an investigation of tax evasion.290 According to the
Court, because Miller shared his information with the bank, he
assumed the risk that this information might later be shared with the
government.291 The Court reaffirmed this stance in Smith v. Maryland
when it found that phone company consumers have no expectation of
privacy in the phone numbers they dial.292 It follows, then, that users of
period and fertility tracking apps will have a difficult time claiming a
reasonable expectation of privacy when they are voluntarily sharing
their private information with a third party. This distinguishes the case
of surveillance of app data from recent cases where the Court limited
the ability to use digital information.293
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court declined to extend the
exception for warrantless searches incident to arrest to include the
entire contents of a cell phone.294 Despite the arrestee having expired
registration tags, a suspended license, two loaded handguns, and items
associated with the “Bloods” street gang, the Court held that cell phone
data differentiated the search from prior cases because of the “vast
quantities of personal information” on a cell phone.295 The Court
reasoned similarly in Carpenter v. U.S., where it held that the thirdparty doctrine did not apply to cell phone location data because it
considered it “qualitatively different.”296 The Court distinguished
between “dialed digits” and a “comprehensive record of the person’s
movements.”297 But these cases include extensive cell phone data
involuntarily obtained by law enforcement incident to arrest. Indeed,
Carpenter involved “unique” cell phone location data “held by a third
party” not voluntarily given to an app the user chose to download and
input data into regularly.298 And while the Ferguson case described in
Part IA does not involve cell phone data, its mention in the Dobbs oral
425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
Id. at 443.
292 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979).
293 See Riley v. California 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (requiring a search warrant to search
data on cell phones after an arrest) and Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, (2018) (holding
cell-site location information did not qualify under third-party doctrine).
294 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2485.
295 Id. at 2480–85.
296 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2216–17.
297 Id. at 2217.
298 Id.
290
291
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argument could suggest its relevance. But despite the Court finding a
Fourth Amendment violation in Ferguson, it was the implementation of
a warrantless search program for law enforcement purposes that was
central to the outcome. In the case of period and fertility tracking apps,
the distinguishing characteristic remains the voluntary provision of
data, which eliminates the expectation of privacy. Thus, these cases
demonstrate why the Fourth Amendment is unlikely to help users of
period and fertility tracking apps.
III. A DIFFERENT FUTURE FOR FEMTECH
In theory, period and fertility trackers could offset some of the
worst possible limitations of reproductive freedoms. But the same
characteristics that give these apps so much promise—their popularity,
affordability, ease of uptake, data, and predictions—also create
significant risks in the current regulatory and legal environment. It
would be naive to claim one neat solution is up to the task of solving a
problem as enormous as the one identified in this Article, especially
when the only real solution is to avoid creating the need for a
reproductive surveillance state in the first place. This Part begins with
mandated solutions but discounts them as realistic standalone
possibilities in light of political, legal, and logistical realities. It then
turns to voluntary solutions that, though not as far-reaching, could
influence beneficial market behaviors and augment federal initiatives.
A. The Difficulty of Mandating Change
Hands-off approaches to consumer health technologies have
fostered conditions that harm consumers. While some states provide
more comprehensive consumer protections than others, and some
developers offer higher-quality products, ineffective and insecure apps
predominate the market. This subpart identifies ways to ensure
uniform changes to accuracy, privacy, and consumer understanding but
cautions that they are imperfect solutions to the complex problem of
protecting and promoting reproductive rights.
1.

Efficacy

The best way to improve product efficacy and reduce market size
is to change the FDA’s regulatory approach. Recall that the FDA
currently regulates software as contraception as a Class II device and
exercises enforcement discretion over the proceptive apps that
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dominate the market.299 To date, the FDA has primarily looked at
marketing and advertising information to determine if contraception is
an app’s “intended use.”300 Moving forward, the FDA should look more
broadly to determine if a product is intended to be used as
contraception.301 For example, the FDA could consider subjective
claims302 and product design.303 It could even look at what the
environment and context convey between a buyer and a seller.304 By
expanding what it considers evidence of intended use, the FDA could
theoretically regulate more—perhaps all—proceptive apps as
contraception.
Further, instead of regulating software as contraception as a
Class II device, the FDA could reclassify them as Class III due to their
“similarity to existing contraceptive devices, reliance on user input, and
demonstrated need for more robust clinical efficacy standards.”305 Class
III devices are the highest risk and generally require premarket
approval (PMA).306 The classification applies to devices that are “of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health” or
those that “present a potential, unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”307
By reclassifying software as contraceptives as Class III, the FDA would
require PMA, necessitating, among other things, non-clinical laboratory
studies and clinical investigations to ensure safety and efficacy.308
Though possible, this type of FDA reform would encounter
significant if not insurmountable hurdles, including resource
limitations and lack of meaningful leverage over app developers. But
perhaps the most significant is the Court’s ruling in West Virginia v.
Environmental Protection Agency, which struck down an EPA rule
See supra notes 131-45.
See supra note 230.
301 Id.
302 Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 789 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[A] factfinder
should be free to pierce all of a manufacturer’s subjective claims of intent . . . to find actual
therapeutic intent on the basis of objective evidence . . .”).
303 See, e.g., Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco Are Regulated as
Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding “Intended
Uses,” 82 Fed. Reg. 2193, at 2208 (Jan. 9, 2017) (providing examples of when the FDA has relied
on product design as circumstantial evidence of intended use).
304 United States v. Travia, 180 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 2001) (“the environment provided
the necessary information between buyer and seller”).
305 Alexandra M. Taylor, Fertile Ground: Rethinking Regulatory Standards for Femtech, 54
UC DAVIS L. REV. 2267, 2287-92 (2021).
306 See 21 U.S.C. § 360(c) (2012). (Class I are the lowest risk and subject to the least regulatory
control; Class II are an intermediate level of risk).
307
PMA Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/premarket-submissions-selecting-and-preparing-correct-submission/premarket-approvalpma.
308 See generally 21 CFR § 814 (premarket approval of medical devices); 21 CFR § 814.20
(describing components of the application).
299
300
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under the Clean Air Act shifting energy to clean power sources to reduce
carbon emissions.309 The seemingly clear connection between reducing
carbon emissions from coal-powered plants into the air and the
authorizing Clean Air Act was less important to the Court than the
rule’s “economic and political significance.”310 Applying the Court’s
reasoning to apps, the FDA’s authority to regulate period and fertility
tracking apps—as opposed to food or drugs—is even less clear than in
the EPA’s case, and the issue undoubtedly relates to a significant
political and economic issue.311 So while the risks period and fertility
tracking apps pose in a post-Dobbs world may incentivize different FDA
action, the Court’s pronouncement of the “major questions doctrine”
limits agency authority to respond to emerging threats not explicitly
contemplated and directed to address in Congressional statute.312
Especially since the definition of medical devices is for products
“intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in
the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,” one might
argue that pregnancy and menstruation are neither diseases nor
conditions.313 Indeed, Congress’s more recent exemption of health apps
intended to maintain or encourage a healthy lifestyle from the
definition of device in the 21st Century Cures Act314 could lead the Court
to determine that Congress specifically rejected the FDA’s authority to
regulate period and fertility tracking apps at all.315
But even if the FDA is able to regulate in this space—now quite
a big if—there are reasons to be skeptical about the substantive impact
we can expect. A key issue is that the FDA lacks the necessary leverage
to enforce these changes beyond sternly worded letters to industry. And
given that past performance is probably the greatest indicator of future
action, there is little reason to believe the FDA would be interested in a

West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S.Ct. 2587, 2587 (2022).
Id. at 2608.
311 See e.g., Texas v. Becerra, State of Texas’s Original Complaint (July 14, 2022) (N.D. TX
2022) (citing West Virginia v. EPA for the proposition that EMTALA cannot be enforced by HHS
with regard to abortion because it is a “major question of ‘deep and political significance’ that
Courts will not assume Congress has assigned the Executive Branch” and “Congress intends to
make major policy decisions itself, not leave those decisions to agencies.”).
312 West Virginia, 142 S.Ct. at 2613 (stating that the connection between the EPA’s actions
and reducing air pollution was not persuasive). For instances of “economic and political
significance” the Court now requires “clear congressional authorization.” Id. at 2614.
313 See supra note 218, at § 321(h)(1)(B).
314 21st Century Cures Act. H.R. 34, 114th Congress. 2016.
315 West Virginia, 142 S.Ct. at 2614 (“We cannot ignore that the regulatory writ EPA newly
uncovered conveniently enabled it to enact a program that, long after the dangers posed by
greenhouse gas emissions ‘had become well known, Congress considered and rejected’ multiple
times.”).
309
310
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more hands-on approach to the “low-risk” health app industry,316 much
less something as contentious and now politically charged as period and
fertility trackers.
Importantly, at least one period and fertility tracking app
developer has already defied FDA warning letters and proven itself
litigious. This creates the real possibility for a challenge to the FDA’s
authority to regulate this entire product category and demonstrates
clear opposition to good-faith participation in the scientific process that
the FDA would require to establish evidence-based apps through
heightened regulatory scrutiny.
Consider Valley Electronics AG v. Polis.317 In this case, a group
of researchers funded by Valley Electronics AG published a study
showing that using their Daysy fertility monitor—especially when
combined with the DaysyView App—could be used for both conception
and contraception at rates higher than previously reported.318 The
company used the study’s findings to advertise 99.4% effectiveness at
preventing pregnancy on social media.319
But there were problems with the study, and a researcher called
for a retraction citing deficiencies in the standard effectiveness
calculations and other methodological concerns.320
After the
321
retraction, the researcher shared her findings, acknowledging that
the lay public rarely reads scientific studies and hoping to counter the
effect of Valley’s marketing. In response, Valley filed a defamation
lawsuit, concerned not only with the researcher's scientific assertions
but her opinions and commentary, including statements she made on
social media, to reporters, and on her blog.322 A federal judge threw out
the case,323 but Valley appealed.324 In 2022, the appellate court affirmed
the judgment, concluding that the researcher’s statements were
nonactionable opinions.325
This dispute might initially read as frivolous, and, from a legal
standpoint, it is. However, the power of defamation cases is not in who

316 The FDA initiated and then abandoned a pre-certification program for app developers. It
continues to revise industry guidance, taking an increasingly hands-off approach to regulation.
317 Valley Electronics AG v. Polis Original Complaint 1:20-cv-02133.
318 See supra note 156
319 See supra note 158.
320 Id.
321 See supra note 157.
322 Kate Sheridan & Casey Ross, In a defamation lawsuit, the hype around digital health
clashes
with
scientific
criticism,
STATNEWS
(March
2,
2022)
available
at
https://www.statnews.com/2022/03/02/health-fertility-thermometer-valley-polis/.
323 Valley Electronics AG v. Polis, district court 1:20-cv-02133.
324 Valley Electronics AG v. Polis, 2nd Circuit Ct App 1:20-cv-02133.
325 Id.
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ultimately wins but in the threat of protracted legal battles.326 Experts
warn that lawsuits like this can make scientific criticism less likely.327
And this chilling effect calls into question not only the ability of
heightened FDA scrutiny to protect consumers from inaccurate apps
but the scientific community’s continued willingness to raise awareness
about the problem. It also represents a scenario that we fear will
become more common if regulators begin to require more scientific
evidence. And an app developer that vigorously defends its product in
court may eventually turn to the regulator itself, emboldened by the
growing chinks in the armor of the administrative state.
2.

Privacy and Security

The outlook for privacy and security is similarly bad. Though the
health-related data contained in period and fertility tracking apps
seems like it should somehow be entitled to the standards and
protections we expect in other sensitive health contexts, it is generally
not. Here, the post-Dobbs criminalization of abortion and pregnancyrelated behaviors limits the ability of privacy and security law to
prevent the reproductive surveillance contemplated by this Article.
At first blush, one might think it could be advantageous to
reform HIPAA to protect menstrual and pregnancy data with its
privacy and security standards. In fact, scholars have already suggested
such measures specifically in light of the unique risks that period and
fertility trackers pose.328 Reforming HIPAA also has broad bipartisan
support. For example, the Health Data Use and Privacy Commission
Act, introduced in February 2022, acknowledges the deficiencies in
health technology and app governance and would establish a
commission to study and recommend changes to health information
privacy laws.329 Those modifications could extend the scope of HIPAA
beyond covered entities and business associates to include some or all
consumer health technologies. But though consensus says HIPAA is
due for modernization, meaningful momentum has yet to materialize.

326 Lawsuits like this are also referred to as “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation”
(SLAPP). They are not intended to prevail on the merits, but to harass and financially pressure
defendants and quash constitutional rights. Some states, but not all, have anti-SLAPP laws.
327 See supra note 322.
328 Celia Rosas, The Future is Femtech: Privacy and Data Security Issues Surrounding
Femtech Applications, 15 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 2, 335-37 (2019); Allysan Scatterday, This is No
Ovary-Action: Femtech Apps Need Stronger Regulations to Protect Data and Advance Public Health
Goals, 23 NC J. L. & TECH. 3 (2022).
329 S. 3620 117th Congress 2D Session.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4099764

DRAFT DO NOT CITE

7/18/22 5:10 PM

FEMTECHNODYSTOPIA

51

The FTC could theoretically bring enforcement actions against
more period and fertility tracking apps for unfair or deceptive acts or
practices, but this avenue is similarly unlikely given how the FTC
works. And addressing apps on a case-by-case basis is unlikely to
change the entire market. No matter how aggressively the FTC enforces
the HBNR, it does nothing to help prevent breaches from occurring in
the first place or address the matter of law enforcement exceptions.
Further, the FTC does not currently establish normative privacy
standards or require privacy policies.330 It could, but it would require
rulemaking, which is a complex and years-long process, and the fruits
of that labor are now increasingly suspect under the “major questions
doctrine.”331 Thus, nothing the FTC does in the short term will
meaningfully protect consumers of period and fertility trackers, even
though they have expressed a firm commitment to keeping a close eye
on technologies that contain reproductive health information.332
Aiming even higher than major reforms to HIPAA or improved
FTC oversight would likely prove insufficient for consumers who are
most at risk. Imagine something as sweeping as the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). While the GDPR confers
significantly greater privacy protections than current U.S. law, it is not
a panacea.333 European countries that are highly motivated to develop
digital health evaluation and relatively far along in operationalizing
their frameworks continue to struggle with implementation.334
Research is beginning to expose that heightened legal data protections
via legislation do not always translate to improved data protection on
the ground.335 And even in countries where the GDPR is in place,
330 Jessica Rich, Give the F.T.C. Some Teeth To Guard Our Privacy, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(August 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/opinion/ftc-privacy-congress.html; See
also Solomon Center Report, supra note 234, at 34.
331 Section 5 of the FTC Act empowers the FTC to engage in rulemaking to regulate unfair
and deceptive acts or practices. 5 U.S.C. § 57a. But see West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S.Ct. 2587 (2022)
(concerning an EPA rule initially passed in 2015 that was never put into place before being struck
down by the Court seven years later).
332 Kristin Cohen, Location, Health, and Other Sensitive Information: FTC Committed to Fully
Enforcing the Law Against Illegal Use and Sharing of Highly Sensitive Data, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION
BUSINESS
BLOG
(July
11,
2022)
https://www.ftc.gov/businessguidance/blog/2022/07/location-health-other-sensitive-information-ftc-committed-fully-enforcinglaw-against-illegal-use.
333 IRISH COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, The Biggest Data Breach (May 2022) (exposing the
risks of Real-Time Bidding and finding that People in the US have their online activity and realworld location exposed 57% more often than people in Europe).
334 Anna Essen, Ariel D. Stern, Christoffer Bjerre Haase, Josip Car, et. al. Health App Policy:
International Comparison of Nine Countries’ Approaches, npj DIGITAL MED. 5:31 (2022).
335 Martin Tisne and Marietje Schaake, The data delusion: Protecting individual data is not
enough when the harm is collective; See also Shipp and Blasco, supra note 96 (finding that that
none of the apps included in the study “were able to provide the necessary information on all
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popular period and fertility tracking apps fail to protect the legal rights
of their consumers.336
Other options exist. For example, scholars have proposed a duty
of loyalty for companies that process consumer information,337 special
protections for intimate information that limit its collection and use and
provide remedies for victims,338 and even more aspirational reforms
inspired by intersectional feminist perspectives.339 To the extent law
and regulation can bring about these changes, we believe they should.
But in states that criminalize reproductive choices—through either
criminal statutes or civil enforcement such as SB8—these approaches
will fail. Privacy laws—including the My Body, My Data Act, drafted
with Dobbs and menstruation tracking at the forefront—contain
glaring exceptions for law enforcement,340 subpoena and discovery
requests, and inevitably run up against the need to balance individual
privacy interests with the very real security risks of “going dark.”341 So
long as the government retains the ability to access consumer data in
appropriate circumstances, even if the American public disagrees on
what those appropriate circumstances are, vulnerabilities will persist.
And so long as the state vigorously asserts an interest in the fetus at all
stages of development through its police powers, even the most
ambitious legislative reforms will not prevent reproductive
surveillance.

privacy rights, as determined by [the General Data Protection Regulation.]”).; IT for Change, supra
note 215 at 8; Privacy International, supra note 172.
336 See supra note 96 (finding that that none of the apps included in the study “were able to
provide the necessary information on all privacy rights, as determined by [the General Data
Protection Regulation.]”); Privacy International, supra note 173 (reporting on the results of Data
Subject Access Requests and finding that one app did not provide the requested data, one did not
respond, and one refused to let the consumer publish the data).
337 Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. U. L. REV.
961 (2021).
338 Danielle Keats Citron, A New Compact for Sexual Privacy, 62 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 6
(2021).
339 Michele Estrin Gilman, Feminism, Privacy, and Law in Cyberspace, Oxford Handbook of
Feminism and Law in the U.S. (Deborah L. Brake, Martha Chamallas, & Verna L. Williams, eds.)
at 15 (2021); Michele Estrin Gilman, Periods for Profit and the Rise of Menstrual Surveillance, 41
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 100, 113 (2021).
340 MY BODY, MY DATA ACT, 117th Congress 2d Session.
341 Statement of James B. Comey, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public Safety
and Privacy, (July 8, 2015) https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/going-dark-encryption-technologyand-the-balances-between-public-safety-and-privacy.
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B. The Hail Mary of Influencing Change
Laws and regulations could theoretically improve protections for
consumers of period and fertility trackers. But, realistically speaking,
they probably will not. The priorities of state and federal agencies are
subject to logistical realities and political influence. Mandated
interventions are also frequently subject to legal challenges. These
challenges create delay and are likely a doomed proposition in light of
the current makeup of the Supreme Court and its recent decisions. The
instability—and, more importantly, the improbability—of these
solutions means they are insufficient to address the fragility of
remaining reproductive rights, especially in states that criminalize
reproductive choices. Unfortunately, then, we cannot pin our hopes
exclusively on the law. But our choices are not perfectly binary. The
technology industry, interest groups, and even individual consumers
are better positioned to avoid the worst possible outcomes in the short
term. And as scary a proposition as that is, it is preferable to waiting
for the government to impose mandated solutions that will take far
longer to implement but may never come and possibly fall short even if
they do.
1.
Technology Industry Solutions
Viewed idealistically, the technology industry is responsible for
addressing abuse facilitated by their platforms.342 The First
Amendment protects individuals from government prohibitions on
protected speech, but private industry is not the government.
Companies—including ones with a substantial percentage of market
share like Apple, Google, Twitter, and Meta—can and do prohibit
various types of speech all the time (though that may soon change).343
For now, these platforms’ terms of service may specify that they will
remove abusive, offensive, or factually misleading information. As a
result, these companies will suspend or ban accounts or products from
their respective platforms when they run afoul of specified terms of use.
Thus, Big Tech actors can be powerful at moderating which apps
have access to their stores and platforms. A power that could prove
important in limiting the availability of bad, ineffective, or insecure
period and fertility tracking apps in ways the government cannot or will
not. And this ability is not purely theoretical, even as applied to
religiously contentious or politically charged products. For example, in
2019, Google responded to significant public outcry by removing an app
342
343

See Gilman, Cyberspace, supra note 339, at 15.
See e.g. NetChoice LLC v. Ken Paxton. See also NetChocie LLC v. AG of Florida.
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promoting conversion therapy, a discredited and harmful practice
claiming to change the sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender
expression of LGBTQ people,344 developed by a Texas-based Christian
group.345 However, whether Google could get away with this type of
viewpoint censorship now or in the future is an open question.
Assuming ongoing content moderation legal challenges fizzle out
or resolve in favor of technology companies, app stores could take this
power a step further and use their influence to require more detailed
efficacy information to list a product in the app store.346 For example,
app stores could take a more proactive approach in requiring disclosure,
akin to existing privacy labels, and display of certain use and efficacy
information and use that information in search result algorithms that
put better apps at the top, where consumers are more likely to download
them.347 A period and fertility tracking app developer could always
refrain from providing information about efficacy—for example, by
indicating that none is available348—but the app store would present it
in search results below trackers that provide evidence of efficacy and
specify how the app generates predictions.349
There is reason to believe private actors can and would engage
in this type of voluntary behavior. Companies like Apple and Google
have an interest in ensuring quality apps on their platforms. Beyond
being a component of corporate social responsibility and cultivating
consumer goodwill, they also have to protect the economic interests of
themselves and their shareholders. Apple and Google control over 95%
of the app store market,350 and both offer their own period and fertility
tracking product.351 Identifying competitors engaging in harmful
practices that could sour the product category's reputation can help
good products succeed. And bad publicity may be enough to engage in
this type of self-regulation.352
Further, in addition to requiring evidence labels or policing the
products available on their platforms, the technology industry can fill
the gaps created by the lack of federal action through independent,
GLAAD, What is Conversion Therapy, https://www.glaad.org/conversiontherapy.
Ryan Browne, Google Removes Anti-Gay App That Promoted Conversion Therapy After
Backlash, CNBC (March 29, 2019) available at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/29/google-removesanti-gay-app-that-promoted-conversion-therapy.html.
346 Leah R. Fowler, Health App Lemons, 74 ALA. L. REV. -- (forthcoming).
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 Id.
350 David Currey, App Store Data (2022), BUSINESS OF APPS (January 11, 2022)
https://www.businessofapps.com/data/app-stores/.
351 See supra notes 110-11.
352 Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VIRGINIA L.
REV. 467, 476 (2020).
344
345
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private-sector regulatory programs. Groups like Executives for Health
Innovation and the Center for Democracy & Technology proposed one
such program.353 Their work introduces a value-proposition framework
for four key constituencies: consumers, companies collecting healthrelated data not covered by HIPAA, the FTC, and HIPAA-covered
entities.354 Importantly for this Article, the framework would focus on
how, not what, consumer health information is used, shifting the
burden of privacy risk from consumers to companies and helping
consumers select technologies with less confusion and risk.355 It would
also create an avenue for consumer complaints and corrective action.356
They would apply their framework through a self-regulation program—
akin to the American Bar Association or the American Medical
Association—that would establish rules and procedures and
promulgate codes of conduct to which members would agree and
adhere.357 Participating companies would enjoy the financial and
reputational benefits of setting themselves apart from competitors.358
Participation would be voluntary, and an independent thirdparty organization would ensure compliance.359 As the framework's
developers note, this third-party accountability and consumer input are
critical to avoid the inherent conflicts of interest in companies
regulating themselves.360 As they observe, industry action like this has
the added benefit of being faster, nimbler, and more adaptable than
legislative efforts that have failed to materialize.361 However, like the
mandated solutions discussed above, they do not address the problem
of law enforcement.
2.

App Developer Approaches

Importantly, a technology company need not be as powerful as
Apple, Google, or Meta to influence change, either collectively through
private-sector regulatory programs or through independent actions.
Any app developer can make more accurate and secure products
independent of external coercion, perhaps using improvements as a

353 See generally Executives for Health Innovation, The Case for Accountability: Protecting
Health Data Outside the Healthcare System.
354 Proposed Consumer Privacy Framework for Health Data (February 2021).
355 The Case for Accountability, supra note 353, at 9-10.
356 Id. at 10.
357 Id. at 13.
358 Id. at 10.
359 Id. at 13.
360 Id. at 14.
361 Id. at 13.
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marketing tool. This may ultimately be the most promising and realistic
avenue for fast efficacy and privacy reform.
All period and fertility tracking apps should be safe and accurate
and clearly delineate the scope of appropriate uses. App developers
should consider diverse and inclusive perspectives in product design.362
Specifically, they should include medical professionals among the array
of stakeholders providing input as a way to ensure efficacy and medical
soundness.363 These efforts, in turn, can help developers provide better,
more inclusive period and fertility trackers with fewer biases,
inaccuracies, and stereotypes baked into the product.364
Investing in the upfront work to develop an efficacious and
inclusive period and fertility tracker is admittedly an expensive
proposition. But other funding avenues exist outside of traditional
approaches to data monetization, and they need not happen at the
exclusion of low-resource or vulnerable populations. For example,
federally funded research grants or foundation awards may become
available. Reproductive rights organizations or private donors may seek
opportunities to fund accurate and private apps.365 Apps that choose to
charge a fee can do so on a sliding scale that accounts for a consumer’s
ability to pay.366 Insurance companies can likewise step up and improve
access to evidence-based apps.367
More opportunities exist to innovate with privacy and data
security. App designers can include disclaimers about possible data
uses—like the potential for individual or state actors to use app data to
identify early pregnancies or suspicious menstrual patterns.
Developers can promote anonymity by not requiring registration or an
email address.368 Those same apps could encrypt data or ensure that all
data is only stored on a user’s phone, meaning the lack of email
addresses would not raise additional problems with the HBNR in the

362 Mikki Kressbach, Period Hacks: Menstruating in the Big Data Paradigm, TELEVISION &
NEW MEDIA DOI/10.1177/1527476419886389 (2019); Adrienne Pichon, Kasey B. Jackman, Inga T.
Winkler, Chris Bobel, and Noemie Elhadad, The Messiness of the Menstruator: Assessing Personals
and Functionalities of Menstrual Tracking Apps, J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS. ASSOC. 29(2): 385-399
(2022). See also Gilman,, Cyberspace, supra note 339 at 28.
363 See Gilman, Cyberspace, supra note 339, at 28.
364 Id.
365 See supra note 338, at 1830.
366 See Gilman, Periods for Profit, supra note 339 at 113.
367 Lauren Tonti, Femtech Fatale: Access to Femtech in Public Health Insurance Systems, 3
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH 5 (2020). In recent years, Medicare, employers, and other
payers have demonstrated a willingness to expand coverage of digital health services. Solomon
Center Report, supra note 234, at 8.
368 See supra note 173.
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event of a breach.369 Relatedly, app developers can also limit risks by
collecting less data.370 Less data makes it less likely that hackers and
other interested parties use data for nefarious purposes.371 As
lawmakers have underscored for Google’s location data practices, the
decision to collect and retain data is exactly that—a choice.372
Companies can and should make different choices with respect to
collecting and sharing data.373
Period and fertility tracking app developers must also anticipate
law enforcement’s role in policing pregnant bodies. For example, they
might develop a product that does not collect user data or does so in a
way that is unusable.374 A company will not need to worry about
complying with a warrant if they do not have relevant data in the first
place. Further, app developers can build in a “warrant flag,” which
would notify the user if the app were under government surveillance.375
The list goes on. App developers can take new approaches to
informed consent and third-party data sharing, abandoning traditional
terms of service and privacy policies. As others have offered, blockchain
and nonfungible tokens (NFTs) provide novel avenues for improved
data security and for consumers to specify in advance the entities with
whom they are (and are not) comfortable sharing their health data.376
In this way, developers do not drop out of the data economy altogether
and can even contribute to beneficial subsequent uses, like research,
but in a way that respects consumer preferences.
Apps like the ones this Part contemplates are not unthinkable.
Two German examples of publicly funded, non-extractive alternative

369 The HBNR only applies to unsecure data. The HBNR does not require apps that encrypt
personal health records no notify people. U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 252.
370 See supra note 338, at 1821.
371 Id.
372 Letter from 40 members of Congress to Google CEO Sundar Pichai, May 24, 2022.
373 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Cent.
California) (2016) (in which Apple refused to comply with an order compelling Apple Inc. to assist
federal agents in unlocking an iPhone related to a 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernadino).
374 See supra note 4.
375 Id. (“A “warrant flag” is an automated message warning users when the system is being
monitored by the government. Such a system is indispensable when operators receive a warrant
that includes a gag order, preventing them from notifying users. However, when operators already
have a warrant flag system installed, an automated warning will go out whenever they fail to take
action and reset a periodic timer. While the government can order operators to remain silent, they
legally can’t force operators to reset warrant flags, making it a lawful way to communicate.”)
376 Kristin Kostick-Quenet, Kenneth D. Mandl, Timo Minssen, I. Glenn Cohen, Urs Gasser,
Isaac Kohane, and Amy L. McGuire, How NFTs Could Transform Health Information Exchange,
375 SCIENCE 6580 (February 4, 2022); Sebastian Porsdam Mann, Julian Savulescu, Philippe
Ravaud, and Mehdi Benchoufi, Blockchain, consent and prosent for medical research, 47 J. MED.
ETHICS 244 (2021).
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femtech apps already exist.377 There is Periodical,378 an ad-free and
open-source menstruation tracker that was initiated as a community
project with no external funding,379 and drip, developed with funding
from Germany’s Ministry of Education.380 Both apps promote privacy
by only storing data on the user’s device.381 Euki—developed by Women
Help Women,382 an international activist non-profit—does not collect or
store any data and has no back-end system.383 It also anticipates
nefarious uses by, for example, allowing users to enter “0000” when
opening the app under duress to display a false screen.384 These
initiatives provide examples of what is possible for app developers and
collaborators willing to think outside the box.
While undertaking these efforts to improve efficacy, protect
consumer data, and foster informed consumer decision-making is
valuable in itself, there are also commercial benefits. Research has
spotlighted Clue among competing apps regarding the clarity and
transparency of their privacy policy. Particularly noteworthy behaviors
include specifying third parties with which Clue shares user data, as
well as an ability for the consumer to opt-out of deidentified data
sharing with vetted researchers.385 That Clue is so popular is a
testament to their attention to consumer needs and interests. Or, at the
very least, their attention to the GDPR given that Clue is a Berlin-based
company.386 This supports the proposition that innovative apps can
stand out among competitors for their behaviors, voluntary or
otherwise, and reap the financial benefits of that popularity. In a postDobbs future, highly effective apps that promote and protect a user’s
ability to understand and control their own body and data will have an
advantage over those that do not. However, marketing claims about
accuracy and privacy will always merit suspicion and scrutiny.

See supra note 215.
Periodical https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.arnowelzel.android.periodical.
379 See supra note 215.
380 Id.
381 Id.
382 WOMEN HELP WOMEN, womenhelp.org.
383 EUKI APP, https://eukiapp.com/.
384 EUKI APP, https://eukiapp.com/privacy-faq (“If someone asks you to open Euki and you
don't want them to see your data, enter "0000" when you open the app and we'll display a false
screen. You can also customize what content areas are viewable on your dashboard to hide some
and make others easily available.”).
385 See supra note 173.
386
Clue
(@clue),
TWITTER
(May
4,
2022,
9:29
AM)
https://twitter.com/clue/status/1521859643055685636 (reassuring consumers that health data is
private and safe, keeping sensitive data safe is fundamental to company values and business
models, and noting obligations under the GDPR to apply special protections to users’ reproductive
data).
377
378
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Group and Individual Action

Reproductive rights organizations and groups viewing
technology as a new frontier of abortion rights activism will find
significant opportunities for meaningful reform. For example, by
adopting period and fertility trackers as a priority issue, these groups
can raise consumer awareness about the risks and limitations of
existing apps, particularly in combination with academic
researchers.387 These groups can also identify constituent needs and
raise money to fund the design and development of alternative products
that are not purely extractive, or highlight and promote apps that are
effective and protect privacy to the maximum extent possible.388
Some groups are already active, particularly in the data privacy
space. Grassroots organizations like Our Data Bodies illustrate how
interviewing, community organizing, and capacity building can
contribute to developing more inclusive data privacy laws.389 As
feminist scholars have identified the ever-shrinking divide between the
physical bodies of app users and the bodies of data that users produce,390
a corresponding shift of digital consent akin to sexual consent—one that
envisions consent as proactive, specific, continuous, and ongoing, and
allows for negotiation by all involved parties391—is needed.392
Dedicated action by motivated groups with well-defined policy
proposals can be successful. Indeed, the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative
(CCRI), a group dedicated to combating online abuses that threaten
civil rights and civil liberties, has assisted with drafting model criminal
laws and working with members of Congress to develop new approaches

387
An existing example in Mental Health is the One Mind PsyberGuide
https://onemindpsyberguide.org/.
388 See supra note 215 at 15.
389 See Gilman, Cyberspace, supra note 339.
390 Anja Kovacs & Tripti Jain, Informed consent- Said who? A Feminist Perspective on
Principles
of
Consent
in
the
Age
of
Embodied
Data,
https://internetdemocracy.in/reports/informed-consent-said-who-a-feminist-perspective-onprinciples-of-consent-in-the-age-of-embodied-data (2020).
391 Id. at 16-19.
392 There’s even a Feminist Data Manifest-No, a declaration of 32 refusals of harmful data
regimes and commitments to new data futures that centers the needs of vulnerable and
minoritized populations. See Feminist Data Manifest-No https://www.manifestno.com/.
Specifically, the Manifest-No envisions a world in which no means no in all online interactions,
including the meaningful ability to decline digital surveillance without opting out of technologies
entirely. Refusal #9 Feminist Data Manifest-No https://www.manifestno.com/. It also frames
consent in line with the Planned Parenthood FRIES definition (freely given, reversible, informed,
enthusiastic, and specific) instead of notice-and-choice. Refusal #15 Feminist Data Manifest-No
https://www.manifestno.com/;
Planned
Parenthood,
Sexual
Consent,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/relationships/sexual-consent.
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in the context of nonconsensual pornography,393 and have even
defended related state laws from First Amendment challenges in
court.394 They also reach across the public-private divide to the
technology industry to develop policies.395 Other players are active in
reshaping the consumer technology space as well. For example,
Accountable Tech, a non-profit advocating for structural reform of social
media companies, filed a petition with the FTC in 2021 requesting
rulemaking to prohibit surveillance advertising as an unfair method of
competition.396 The right organization could replicate these efforts to
address the problems of period and fertility trackers and post-Dobbs
surveillance. A centerpiece of any advocacy should be pushing back
against the criminalization of abortion, reproductive decision-making,
and
fetal-harming
behaviors
during
pregnancy.
Avoiding
criminalization will be integral to retaining the protections of current
and future privacy laws, no matter how imperfect they may be.
Finally, individuals have an important part to play. A significant
body of literature suggests that consumers are unlikely to shop for
terms in digital contracts, influencing the market's trajectory as a socalled “informed minority,”397 especially in contracts of adhesion where
the option to negotiate more favorable terms is unavailable.398 But,
health apps and advertising may be different.399 The example of Clue
above may indicate that at least some consumers shop for privacy
promises. While Clue is by no means perfect,400 its popularity suggests
that at least the market for privacy terms is less homogenous than one
might assume, creating the potential for influencing the market.401
Cyber Civil Rights Initiative https://cybercivilrights.org/.
Id.
395 Id.
396 Accountable Tech Rulemaking Petition.
397 Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 1 (2014) (testing the
informed-minority hypothesis by studying “the Internet browsing behavior of 48,154 monthly
visitors to the Web sites of 90 online software companies to study the extent to which potential
buyers access the end-user license agreement” and finding that “only one or two of every 1,000
retail software shoppers access the license agreement and that most of those who do access it read
no more than a small portion”).
398 See, e.g., Uri Benoliel & Shmuel I. Becher, The Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B.C. L.
REV. 2255 (2019); Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help?
Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts”, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 165, 179–81 (2011); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 649 (2011); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002). See also Todd D.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983).
399 See Fowler, Hawkins and Roberts, supra note 185, at 15-19.
400 See supra note 215 (noting a lack of transparency about Clue’s collaborators).
401 NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013).
393
394
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Even if an informed minority does not or cannot exist, other
more realistic consumer governance mechanisms may be in play. There
is room for what others have called a “crusading minority”—those
diligent activist consumers who see seller injustice and bad behavior
and complain, file reports, post bad reviews, and sue.402 Activist
consumers are not constrained by traditional understandings of costbenefit analysis, reading or understanding the fine print in consumer
contracts, or any baseline requirement for a critical mass of like-minded
consumers.403 Instead, they act on more idiosyncratic motivations and
respond to transactional expectations instead of stipulated terms.404 By
being sufficiently loud and creating a public relations crisis, sometimes
a crusading minority of just one person is enough.405 For example, in
May 2022, one journalist wrote an exposé about data marketplace
Narrative selling information about consumers of period and fertility
trackers and convinced the company to take those datasets down, even
though it had done nothing illegal.406 And in a world of ubiquitous social
media, this approach may prove particularly effective at influencing
change and raising consumer awareness.
Economic theories about consumer “minorities”—be them
informed or crusading ones—bring us to yet another avenue to
influence changes that can help avert femtech’s dystopian future.
Consumers can also protect themselves—to an extent. Users should be
critical about what apps they select, using research to inform app
choice.407 Those who use apps for contraceptive purposes should push
back on automation bias, which is the tendency to trust technology over
and above individual judgment. Instead, users should understand what
data the app’s algorithm uses to generate predictions. They should also
understand what variables can invalidate readings, such as the
influence of alcohol and sleep on basal body temperature.408 A firm
understanding of the menstrual cycle and the physiological signs of
ovulation will help users understand the strengths and limitations of
fertility awareness as a form of contraception.
402 See generally Yonathan A. Arbel & Roy Shapira, Consumer Activism: From the Informed
Minority to the Crusading Minority, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 2, 233 (2020).
403 Id. at 255.
404 Id. at 256.
405 Id. at 258.
406 Joseph Cox, Data Marketplace Selling Info About Who Uses Period Tracking Apps, VICE
(May 17, 2022) https://www.vice.com/en/article/v7d9zd/data-marketplace-selling-clue-periodtracking-data.
407 Catherine Roberts, These Period Tracker Apps Say They Put Privacy First. Here’s What We
Found, CONSUMER REPORTS (May 25, 2022) https://www.consumerreports.org/healthprivacy/period-tracker-apps-privacy-a2278134145/.
408 See supra note 163.
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Finally, users should configure their devices to help augment
privacy where feasible, such as using two-factor authentication, ad
blockers, and turning off geolocation tracking.409 Several privacy
advocates have published privacy guides for various pro-choice
stakeholders,410 and so has the Department of Health and Human
Services.411 Others, though, have rightly cautioned that even the most
robust and impractical individual privacy-enhancing precautions are
powerless in a world as connected as ours.412 At least as far as period
and fertility tracking apps are concerned, limiting the data a consumer
shares is an unworkable solution for a product that depends on vast
quantities of data to improve predictive abilities. To that end, users
should research apps that only store data locally on the user’s device
and do not participate in third-party data sharing.413 They should also
be intensely skeptical of developer claims that all user data is
anonymized,414 that the app employs end-to-end encryption,415 or that
the company will delete user data.416 Importantly, consumers should
never consent to warrantless law enforcement searches of a mobile

409 See Gilman, Periods for Profit, supra note 339, at 111. See also Our Data Bodies, Digital
Defense Playbook: Community Tools for Reclaiming Data (2018).
410 See e.g., Daly Barnett, Digital Security and Privacy Tips for Those Involved in Abortion
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2022)
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Sarah Emerson and Emily Baker-White, In A Post-Roe America, Googling “Abortion” Could Put
You At Risk. Here’s How To Protect Yourself, BUZZFEED (May 4, 2022)
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/sarahemerson/abortion-digital-privacy-guide; Lily Hay
Newman, How To Protect Your Digital Privacy if Roe v. Wade Falls, WIRED (May 5, 2022)
https://www.wired.com/story/roe-v-wade-privacy-practices/; Cahn and Manis, supra note 4 at 1315.
411 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Protecting the Privacy and Security of
Your Health Information When Using Your Personal Cell Phone or Tablet, (June 29, 2022)
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/cell-phone-hipaa/index.html.
412 Janet Vertesi, I Hid My Pregnancy From the Internet So I Know: Online Privacy Is Nearly
Impossible, LA TIMES (May 16, 2022, 3:10 AM) https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-0516/pregnancy-internet-online-privacy-impossible; Janet Vertesi, My Experiment Opting Out of Big
Data Made Me Look Like a Criminal, TIME, May 1, 2014, https://time.com/83200/privacy-internetbig-data-opt-out/.
413 See supra note 406.
414 See supra note 332.
415 Leigh McGowran, Period Tracker Stardust Rolls Back Encryption Claims Amid Scrutiny,
SILICON REPUBLIC (June 28, 2022) https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/stardust-periodapp-encryption.
416 Lawson v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (22-CIV-02723). Superior Court of the State of California
County of San Mateo. (filed 7/5/2022) (alleging a “tool that allowed [Facebook/Meta Inc. employees]
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phone, even if the search is ostensibly unrelated to abortion and no
matter how minor the alleged offense.417
While digital self-defense measures cannot hurt, we believe the
onus should not be on the consumer to self-educate and complete due
diligence or opt out of these technologies entirely. Instead, as this Part
offers, the responsibility can and should be shared.
CONCLUSION
Those on the frontlines of pro-choice advocacy have long sounded
the alarm on the dangers to Roe and the endgame of the anti-choice
movement. For years, many of those same activists were called
alarmists and assured that these reproductive rights stood on firm legal
ground, protected by years of legal precedent. But, with Dobbs, those
much-feared worries have come to pass, with far-reaching implications
for other rights and the surveillance required to enforce proposed
restrictions. But while the outcome is bad, it is also a call to action.
We and many others believe that the fight will not stop at
bedrooms or doctor’s offices and that the next battleground will be in
the digital sphere.418 Period and fertility trackers are, on their face,
promising tools in the fight to preserve bodily autonomy as others would
systematically strip it away. However, without significant reform to
shore up accuracy, privacy, and consumer awareness, these
technologies are also dangerous. Thus, our Article argues that a
combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches is needed to ensure
that our warnings of femtech’s dystopian future do not come to pass like
so many other warnings about reproductive freedoms.
Period and fertility tracking apps are the most obvious consumer
technologies but by no means the only ones that could be
instrumentalized to criminalize abortion419 and other behaviors during
pregnancy. Thus, femtech in the post-Dobbs legal landscape is but one
stark example of a much bigger technological threat. But the answer
should never be to tell those who are or are capable of becoming
pregnant to stay off the Internet. We all deserve better solutions than
See Mass Extraction, supra note 207.
See supra note 209.
419 Purchase patterns, location, and web search
history, and text messages are a few
examples. Geoffrey A. Fowler and Tatum Hunter, Your Phone Could Reveal If You’ve Had An
Abortion,
THE
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(May
4,
2022)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/05/04/abortion-digital-privacy/; Joseph Cox,
Location Data Firm Provides Heat Maps of Where Abortion Clinic Visitors Live (May 5, 2022) VICE
https://www.vice.com/en/article/g5qaq3/location-data-firm-heat-maps-planned-parenthoodabortion-clinics-placer-ai.
417
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that. Technology in a world with an anemic right to privacy endangers
everyone. But it will take dedicated action today—and a belief that we
should remain steadfastly committed to avoiding the worst possible
outcomes by whatever means available—to keep femtechnodystopia
from becoming just a trial balloon for other, more far-reaching control.
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